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ABSTRACT
Imagined Futures: Feminist Sciences Studies in an Era of Climate Change Denial
by
Emily K. Crandall
Advisor: Alyson Cole
What space is there for critical approaches to science in a context where the authority of
science to say anything meaningful, or to prescribe, appears to be somewhat tenuous—in other
words, in a moment of rampant climate change denial? To answer this question against the
backdrop of the common refrain that the problem is one of capitalism vs. the climate (e.g. Naomi
Klein 2014), I examine cases where debates about science, economistic organizational
arrangements, and political clashes between neoliberals and environmentalists come together,
while insisting on the view, following critical engagements with the sciences, that the sciences
and their societies co-produce one another. I ask, what visions for the future are bundled in our
debates about climate science? In response to such queries, I argue in this dissertation that
recourse to a traditional positivist understanding of science leads us to irresolvable conundrums
in the context of environmental concerns and in the clash with capitalism.
As I demonstrate throughout the dissertation, political neoliberalism wields the armor of
science strategically—it cloaks market fundamentalism and its attendant values within it, thus
redrawing the discursive terms of engagement around ideology rather than knowledge. Centerleft liberals (encapsulated by mainstream climate science and Democratic party politics, who
often also have a hand in fostering structural neoliberalism) in turn insist on the strengthening of
scientific authority in response to this attack. I argue that the attachment to neutrality, reason, and
objectivity as ways to secure scientific authority not only in some ways legitimates the political
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neoliberal strategy, but also preempts a truly critical, imaginative position – a response that takes
as its core objective the end of exploitation of human and nature alike. As I show, we need
feminist engagements with science in order to refuse the neoliberal terms of engagement, and
crucially to offer new grounds with which to “move on” in politics/knowledge.
In particular, the first chapter examines how the structural neoliberal arrangement of the
academy—increased disciplinarity and the dominance of behavioralism—influenced the study of
politics. Smuggled into this rubric for knowledge production are the values of mid-twentieth
century anti-communist fervor, namely an ideological commitment to the specific type of
freedom that the “free market” ostensibly secures. Given the critique of capitalism embedded in
the anthropogenic climate change thesis, I argue that an updated version of Sheldon Wolin’s
articulation of the imaginative vision in political theorizing—one that takes seriously the
feminist, anti-racist, postcolonial critiques of vision and of science—is both the purview of
environmental political thought, and a necessary rubric for it to harness that which is required for
a broader, richer, more capacious imagining of the possibilities for the ordering of collective life.
Specifically, I read Wolin’s account of imaginative vision alongside Donna Haraway’s critical
feminist account of vision as a cautionary note to environmental political theorists against
deference to scientific knowledge.
In order to address the other modes of neoliberalism at work in contestations over the
authority of science on questions of the environment—the attendant political rationalities, their
affects and intensities—I look to two different cases where political neoliberalism infuses
climate change denial. The second chapter asks whether it is the case that climate change denial
can be explained as a function of ignorance about science. Given that white evangelicals in the
United States are the demographic most likely to report high rates of climate change denial, I
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turn to philosophical work on epistemologies of ignorance in order to examine the epistemic
practices of the prominent evangelical community leaders who advocate this view. I demonstrate
that the success of the evangelical strategy lies in its redrawing of the terms of discourse and
debate, positioning itself as guardian of the interests of “real science,” and of grounding both of
these moves in the preservation of the evangelical way of life.
The third chapter examines the recurrent phenomena in the 20th century where a
prominent environmentalist/scientist engaged in a public debate with a political neoliberal critic
on the subject of whether they had in some way corrupted scientific practice. Turning to critiques
on the same grounds of feminist philosophers of science, I argue that the insistence on the
importance of separating ideology from science in climate change debates cloaks the historically
contingent formations and meanings of reason and objectivity in the guise of neutrality. A return
to feminist arguments that the body, values, and connectedness are required to give better
accounts of the world reveals the limitation of this debate constrained by structural neoliberal
rationality and frustrated by political neoliberal maneuvering. I also argue that environmental
science and feminist philosophy are important political/methodological bedfellows. To the extent
that the Anthropocene reconfigures the boundary between human and nature, we should also
view it as an invitation to re-examine our diagnostic tools.
Taken together, these chapters articulate the multiple registers and modalities in which
norms and concepts of science permeate our political debates and our ways of organizing
collective life. In the conclusion, I turn explicitly to the concept of imagination, where I argue
that a critical orientation toward neutrality points us toward feminist futures. In particular, I turn
to science fiction to argue for broad and adventurous reading practices, playfulness with our
tools for inquiry, and insistence on reclaiming the discursive terms of debate.
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Introduction
Contestations Over the Authority of Science
Photographs circulating in the press and on social media throughout the first years of
Donald Trump’s presidency depict seas of protestors at the inaugural Women’s March and
March for Science across the United States, many wielding signs that declare “Science is Real.”
At the same time, a public debate rages on: is postmodernism responsible for fake news?1
Trump’s twitter feed is littered with sarcastic quips about the need for “fake” global warming in
the midst of each new polar vortex weather event, while his administration is staffed with figures
whose views on climate change range from considering it a hoax to expressing skepticism about
the degree to which scientists agree on the specifics, or skepticism about the degree to which the
evidence demands restrictions on the economy.2 At stake in each of these phenomena is a
political contestation over the authority of science. In this dissertation, I aim to unpack the stakes
in such contestations, particularly when the uncertain future of the planet is both the landscape
against which we debate scientific authority and the grounds for the conflicting political and
economic imaginaries that suffuse these debates. Put differently, I ask, what visions for the
future are bundled in our debates about climate science?
The failure to respond to climate change—or the conflict over what an adequate response
should look like—is widely understood to be a conflict between capitalism and the environment.

1

Kenan Malik, “not post-truth as too many ‘truths,’” Pandaemonium, February 5, 2017; Truman
Chen, “Is Postmodernism to blame for post-truth?” Philosophy Talk, February 17, 2017; William
E. Connolly, “Fake News and ‘Postmodernism:’ the Fake Equation,” Contemporary Condition,
May 2018; Victor Davis Hanson, “Fake News: Postmodernism by Another Name,” Hoover
Institution, January 26, 2017.
2
Emily Holden and Jeremy C.F. Lin, “Trump’s climate science doubters,” Politico, March 6,
2018; Emily Holden, “Climate change deniers run the Trump administration,” Politico, March 7,
2018.
1

This is evident in recent public discourse—from Naomi Klein’s 2014 book, This Changes
Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate, or the proposed designation of the “Anthropocene”3 as a
new geologic era to recent proposals for a green new deal—but was also pervasive throughout
the twentieth century. In 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson released a report from the
President’s Science Advisory Committee entitled “Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,”
in which he illustrated precisely this dynamic:
Ours is a nation of affluence. But the technology that has permitted our affluence
spews out vast quantities of wastes and spent products that pollute our air, poison
our waters, and even impair our ability to feed ourselves. At the same time, we
have crowded together into dense metropolitan areas where concentration of
wastes intensifies the problem.
Pollution is now one of the most pervasive problems of our society. With our
numbers increasing, and with our increasing urbanization and industrialization,
the flow of pollutants to our air, soils and water is increasing. This increase is so
rapid that our present efforts in managing pollution are barely enough to stay
even, surely not enough to make the improvements that are needed.4
Affluence, urbanization, industrialization, and technological excess—these are the drivers and
run-offs of the capitalist economy that are understood to be depleting the resources required to
maintain capitalist production at existing levels (of excess). At the same time, they are positioned
as eroding that very quality of life even as they are ostensibly securing it. Technological
innovation that was supposed to allow us to live longer, healthier, more free lives increasingly

3

I will deal more extensively with debates around the “Anthropocene” in chapters one and three,
but to quickly introduce the term, it describes a new geologic era wherein which human activity
has exerted an influence over earth-systems, which many scholars date to the industrial
revolution. As such, part of what is at stake in these debates is the question of whether capitalism
necessarily poses a threat to earth-systems, or whether this relationship is historically contingent.
I somewhat sidestep this question in the dissertation, as I focus specifically on the role of
epistemology in facilitating the conflict between capitalism and the environment.
4
“Restoring the Quality of Our Environment,” Report of The Environmental Pollution Panel,
President’s Science Advisory Committee, November 1965.

2

renders access to clean air and water precarious, removes us from food production, and alienates
us from nature. And massive wealth accumulation through the free market that was supposed to
alleviate the suffering of poverty has instead concentrated resources in the hands of an
increasingly smaller few and has justified massive global exploitation.
To the extent that climate science is responsible for spotting this conflict, diagnosing it,
and uncovering its consequences, its authority necessarily poses a challenge to the capitalist
order. If the advocates of capitalism imagine it to be the harbinger of human progress, while
climate change theses suggest that capitalism is incapable of making good on its promises of
progressive achievement of human flourishing and on capitalism’s own “natural” regeneration,
then the challenge that it poses is multivalent: it is a challenge to the myths that sustain and
infuse the capitalist ethos, a challenge to capitalist practices, and a challenge to capitalism’s
orientation toward, or relationship with, nonhuman nature. That “science” is somehow
responsible for naming this challenge is evident even in Johnson’s letter. He continues:
Looking ahead to the increasing challenges of pollution as our population grows
and our lives become more urbanized and industrialized, we will need increased
basic research in a variety of specific areas, including soil pollution and the
effects of air pollutants on man. We must give highest priority of all to increasing
the numbers and quality of the scientists and engineers working on problems
related to the control and management of pollution.5
The formulation is as follows: capitalist practices are eroding quality of life, and in order to
curtail and restrain these practices, we need to invest (both financially and ideologically) in the
scientists who can offer us solutions to this erosion. But note the qualities of both “science” and
“capitalism” at work here. Johnson articulates a mandate for science to “control” and “manage”
the effects of the status quo’s practices rather than to destabilize or reconfigure that status quo,

5

Science Advisory Committee, “Restoring.”
3

rendering capitalism’s growth inevitable, and science as a technique of management for that
growth. At the same time as climate science, even as articulated by an American President,
carries an implicit critique of capitalism within it, it still takes place within the purview of
capitalist economic processes. As such, the dominant understanding of good science as neutral
and objective combines with its directive as a tool for managing the social order.
Consider a more recent example. In a Senate hearing over Representative Alexandria
Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal for a Green New Deal, Senator Mike Lee mocked the proposal as a
work of science fiction, showing graphics ranging from stills from the Star Wars film franchise
to President Ronald Reagan riding a dinosaur. He claimed, “Climate change is an engineering
problem – not social engineering, but the real kind. It’s a challenge of creativity, ingenuity, and
technological invention. And problems of human imagination are not solved by more laws, but
by more humans! More people mean bigger markets for innovation.”6 Though Lee sidesteps the
question of whether anthropogenic climate change is real, his minimization of a proposal that
proceeds from evidence amassed by climate science, through his insistence on the role of
markets, is revealing. He draws a distinction between social engineering and “real” engineering
as a way to also align “real” engineering with “bigger markets,” thus again aligning real science
with the status quo social order, and perhaps leaving it up to his constituents to draw the line
between a particular kind of climate science and the undesirable (or even unnatural) order that
requires social engineering.
Though I have begun to articulate this landscape by sketching ways in which capitalism
and climate change are counter-posed, in unpacking debates about science in environmental

6

Katie Bernard, “Sen. Mike Lee says solution to climate change ‘is to fall in love, get married
and have some kids,’ CNN, March 26, 2019.
4

contexts throughout the dissertation I focus my theorizing on neoliberalism more directly. There
are several reasons for this. First, in asking what visions for the future are bundled in our debates
about science, I am not only tracking the material arrangements of the economy itself, but rather
how beliefs in the “free” market as either the only or the best way to secure human freedom
(which I refer to throughout as political neoliberalism, a choice I will elaborate below) come to
infuse a variety of other political positions that pose challenges to the project of adequately
responding to the threat posed by climate change and to the underlying questions of scientific
truth and authority, particularly in the context of the United States. The other major reason for
tracking neoliberalism as opposed to capitalism is as somewhat of a shorthand for describing an
array of other institutional/organizational arrangements (including those of the academy and
scientific research) outside of a strict notion of the economy as such, but whose arrangements are
nonetheless shot through with economistic logics (which I refer to throughout as structural
neoliberalism).
This political neoliberalism is a coalition of hard-right conservatives, those who profit
from the fossil fuel industry, who actively reject the need for a robust (or any) social welfare
state, and who champion an extreme version of the personal responsibility ethic. Though this is a
somewhat unusually narrow definition of political neoliberalism, I use it again as somewhat of a
shorthand in reference to, on one hand, the way that historians of science name the conglomerate,
coordinated effort to manufacture doubt about first cigarette harms and later climate change,7 and
on the other hand, as a way to signal the influence of substantive neoliberal thinkers (e.g.
Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Julian Simon, and others) on climate change deniers, such as
the ones whose work lends the views of Trump’s administration their substance. I develop this

7

Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway, Merchants of Doubt (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2010).
5

point below and offer readings of salient dimensions of this political neoliberalism in chapters
two and three. The other neoliberalism at work involves structural forces such as the increased
privatization, marketization, and financialization of collective life and of public goods and
services, especially of media, research, and governance. As I demonstrate throughout the
dissertation, political neoliberalism wields the armor of science strategically—it cloaks market
fundamentalism and its attendant values within it, thus redrawing the discursive terms of
engagement around ideology or bias, rather than around best knowledge practices. Center-left
liberals (encapsulated by mainstream climate science and Democratic party politics, who often
also have a hand in fostering structural neoliberalism) in turn insist on the strengthening of
scientific authority in response to this attack. I argue that the attachment to neutrality, reason, and
objectivity as ways to secure scientific authority not only in some ways legitimates the political
neoliberal strategy, but also preempts a truly critical, imaginative position – a response that takes
as its core objective the end of exploitation of human and nature alike. As I will show, we need
critical feminist engagements with science in order to refuse the neoliberal terms of engagement,
and crucially to offer new grounds with which to “move on” in politics/knowledge.
Critical approaches to the sciences have been urgent for a litany of social justice issues—
many of which share affinities with environmental ventures, such approaches as decolonial
feminist thought and environmental justice projects.8 Scholars and activists have, for example,
tracked how social structures such as gender and race impact what becomes publicly considered
as legitimate scientific knowledge, and have challenged scientific knowledge that has been
complicit in the systematic oppression of female, non-white, homosexual, non-binary gender
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E.g., Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (New York: Zed Books, 2014); Joni
Adamson, Mei Mei Evans, and Rachel Stein, Environmental Justice Reader: Politics, Poetics,
and Pedagogy (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2002).
6

identified, or otherwise “deviant” bodies. This poses another way to frame the overarching
question of the dissertation: what space is there for critical approaches to science in a context
where the authority of science to say anything meaningful, or to prescribe, appears to be
somewhat tenuous, such as in the context of rampant climate change denial? To answer this
question, I examine cases where all of these elements (debates about science, economistic
organizational arrangements, and clashes between political neoliberals and environmentalists)
come together, while insisting on the view, following critical engagements with the sciences, that
the sciences and their societies co-produce one another. I argue throughout the dissertation that
this view enables us to ask different questions, to read differently, and to imagine alternate
futures. Further, I argue that recourse to a traditional positivist understanding of science leads us
to irresolvable conundrums in the context of environmental concerns in the clash with capitalism.
When we uncritically insist that “science is real,” we neglect the ways that scientism and
structural neoliberalism are both historically and methodologically intertwined – thereby ceding
discursive ground to the neoliberal political imaginary, particularly insofar as it deploys Western
ideas about the hierarchy of knowledges, and the appropriate relationship of humans to
nonhuman nature. In leaving intact the preference for an objective and detached science as the
ultimate authority in knowledge production, we also leave intact the logics of mastery and
possession over nature, and the mandate of science as a tool for the control and management of
the social order. I develop this argument further in chapters one and three, but to summarize it
here, scientism is intertwined with structural neoliberalism methodologically insofar as both are
rendered guardians—through their commitment to the principle of rationality—of the assumption
that bigger, “freer” markets are a prerequisite for the innovation and ingenuity required for
progress and for human flourishing. Historically, these arrangements are a function of the post-
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war organization of the Anglo-American academy, and an attempt to distinguish the knowledge
produced in those academies from that of first Nazi science, and later Soviet science.9 Where
scientists insisted on reason and objectivity as stalwarts against ideology, they drew on
democratic norms of openness and competition as required to secure them. I argue throughout
the dissertation that critical engagements with objectivity, reason, science, and with knowledge
more generally, are crucial for untangling knowledge production from neoliberal logics.10

Methods and Interventions
I am both substantively and methodologically indebted in this dissertation to feminist
epistemology and philosophy of science—or feminist science studies, depending on the
disciplinary arrangement.11 I treat this area of scholarship as a mode of intervention into other
scholarly debates, as a reading practice, and as offering an account of the world in its own right.
In particular, I draw on and build from two different modes of critical engagement with science.
On one hand, I deploy the practice of situating dominant scientific norms and practices in their
social/historical contexts as a way to offer a new reading of our current predicament. On the
other hand, I look to feminist norms and practices as alternatives to the status quo.

9

Sandra Harding. Science and Social Inequality: Feminist and Postcolonial Issues (Urbana and
Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2006); Sandra Harding, Objectivity and Diversity: Another
Logic of Scientific Research (Urbana and Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
10
In this sense, I posit that the relationship between scientism and neoliberalism is not necessary,
but rather is historically and discursively contingent upon a particularly narrow understanding of
science. Thank you to John McMahon for flagging this question.
11
Though in some ways it is a somewhat arbitrary distinction, feminist epistemology/philosophy
of science is more likely to be found in a traditional philosophy department, and to be a bit more
traditionally philosophical in writing and argumentation styles, whereas science studies tends to
be a bit more explicitly interdisciplinary. I use them somewhat interchangeably throughout the
dissertation, as on my reading, they are substantively and methodologically cohesive.
8

For example, I draw on work on the co-constitution of nature and culture12—scholarship
that has shown how, in Anne Fausto-Sterling’s terms, “cultural understandings or beliefs,
whether conscious or unconscious, influence the construction of scientific theory.”13 In other
words, the theoretical framework within which scientific investigations are interpreted is largely
influenced by already existing cultural narratives, and further that scientific theory then plays a
role in defining social concepts and norms. The analysis of the scientists in these studies as an
example of the influence of cultural understandings on scientific theory is meant not to be a
commentary on “bad” or biased science, but rather to emphasize that even “good” science and
consistently valid experiments can be interpreted in ways that in a different time and place seem
laughable, but that nevertheless have enormous consequences for social and cultural norms.
What is important for Fausto-Sterling is that there is no causal direction between these cultural
understandings and the scientific theory. She argues instead that “the relationship between the
activities of the scientists, their cultural attitudes, the theories they devise, and their effects on
human biology and social institutions are nonlinear and multidirectional.”14 I use these accounts
as a practice for reading how historical, cultural conceptualizations of the human relationship to
nonhuman nature permeate discourse on objectivity in science in the context of debates about
climate change. The idea here is not to say that we can never know whether climate change is
happening and human propelled because there is no such thing as objectivity, but rather that
objectivity itself has particular cultural normative value that is contingent upon a specific

12

Anne, Fausto-Sterling, “Society Writes Biology/Biology Constructs Gender,” Daedalus 116,
no. 4 (1987): 61-76; Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of
Nature in the World of Modern Science (New York: Routledge, 1991); Karen Barad, Meeting the
Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2007).
13
Fausto-Sterling, “Society Writes,” 61.
14
Ibid, 74.
9

understanding of human subjectivity (relative to nonhuman nature), and thus that claims to it
often involve the promotion of these particular cultural values, stylized as neutral.
I also draw on work that articulates specifically feminist epistemic commitments—such
as those of standpoint theory, intersectionality, epistemic privilege, and epistemologies of
ignorance.15 These accounts reject notions of a priori scientific objectivity, are critically engaged
with the location and process of knowledge formation, reimagine nature/culture relations, and
embrace a more expansive notion of interconnectedness between matter (human and nonhuman)
and meaning. Feminist science studies, epistemology, and philosophy of science, I argue
throughout, are necessary lenses through which to overcome the limitations of a traditional
positivism and to develop the vocabulary, the imagination, and the knowledge necessary for
adequately contesting notions of freedom delivered through economistic management. Without
the intervention of both the values and the modes of knowledge production and evaluation
provided by feminist science studies and epistemology, the climate change debate is vastly
limited in what it can imagine for the future. This framework further offers an important
contribution to environmental political thought, suggesting that theorizing climate change should
include a capacious engagement with the co-constitution of environmental science and
environmental politics.

15

Alison Wylie, “Why Standpoint Matters,” In Science and Other Cultures: Issues in
Philosophies of Science and Technology, edited by Robert Figueroa and Sandra Harding, 26-48
(New York: Routledge, 2003); Patricia Hill Collins, “Learning From the Outsider Within: The
Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought,” Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1986): 14-32;
Kimberle W. Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence
against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991): 1241-1299; Fricker, Miranda,
Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford University Press, 2007; Nancy
Tuana, “The speculum of ignorance: The women's health movement and epistemologies of
ignorance,” Hypatia 21, no. 3 (2006): 1-19; Robert N. Proctor and Linda Schiebinger, eds.,
Agnotology: The Making & Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008).
10

Mainstream environmental political theory—a somewhat recent subfield that grounds
questions of how we should organize collective life explicitly in environmental concerns and
contexts—has dealt with questions of futurity in many different ways. Scholars have used
climate change as a medium through which to cultivate insights and to test normative and
empirical premises. Some have engaged in normative debates about the allocation of the global
atmospheric commons,16 while others have traced the deep connections between climate change
effects and the difficulty of developing adequate ethical sensibilities as a main source of the
problem of developing meaningful policy action on the climate.17 Still others have considered the
ways in which rights claims shape the design of a global policy regime, while critics of this view
have maintained that liberal conceptions of rights and justice are inadequate for capturing the
various dimensions of global injustice in global environmental politics.18 Scholars have also
developed accounts of climate justice for the purpose of mitigating vulnerability – the
vulnerability both of contemporary populations, for instance in how we can limit the dangers of
climate change without driving large portions of the world’s population further into poverty, and
also the vulnerability of future generations.19 If we expand the contours of mainstream
environmental political theory to include ecomarxism and ecofeminism, scholars have extended

16

E.g. Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005); Caney, “Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and the Social
Discount Rate,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 13, no.4 (2014): 320-342; Caney, “Two
Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens,” Journal of Political Philosophy
22, no. 3 (2013): 125-149; and Caney, “Justice and the Basic Right to Justification,” in Justice,
Democracy and the Right to Justification: Rainer Forst in Dialogue, edited by David Owen,
147-168 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).
17
E.g. Stephen M. Gardiner, Simon Caney, Dale Jamieson, and Henry Shue eds., Climate Ethics:
Essential Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
18
Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Climate Change (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
19
Henry Shue, Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014).
11

analyses of domination and oppression on gender, race, and class lines, to an analysis of the
domination and oppression of nature/the earth.20 Some scholars have articulated the theoretical
grounds for reimagining human life as intricately intertwined with nonhuman life.21 Others have
argued that capitalist values of production are deeply in conflict with an ecological worldview,
and that a plan to mitigate the harms of climate change necessarily entails a challenge to
capitalist modes of production.22
While many of these projects are in some sense compatible with my own – which I
characterize as an exercise in environmental political theory itself – turning to feminist science
studies contributes several interventions. First, it requires us to take care with our methodological
tools—even (or perhaps especially) when we take them for granted as neutral. It reminds us to
ask, as I argue with Donna Haraway in chapter one, “with whose blood were my eyes crafted?”
Second, it lets us play with the idea of what counts as a text worthy for rigorous interpretation. If
knowledge is produced, mediated, and disseminated in all of these broad, interconnected ways,
then we can look for cues to give an account of our world everywhere. Thus, in chapters two and

20

John P. Clark, “Marx’s Inorganic Body,” Environmental Ethics 11, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 243–
258; Paul Burkett, Marx and Nature: A Red and Green Perspective (New York: St. Martin’s
press, 1999); Paul Burkett, Marxism and Ecological Economics: Toward a Red and Green
Political Economy (New York: Haymarket Books, 2009); John Bellamy Foster, Marx’s Ecology:
Materialism and Nature (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000); John Bellamy Foster and
Paul Burkett, “The Dialectic of Organic/Inorganic Relations: Marx and Hegelian Philosophy of
Nature,” Organization Environment 13 (2000): 403-425; Val Plumwood, Feminism and the
Mastery of Nature (London: Routledge, 1993); Val Routley, “On Karl Marx as an environmental
hero,” Environmental Ethics, 3 (1981): 237-244.
21
Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press,
2010); Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).
22
Robin Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory: Toward an Ecocentric Approach
(Albany: SUNY Press,1992); Robin Eckersley, “Socialism and Ecocentrism: Toward a New
Synthesis,” In The Greening of Marxism: Democracy and Ecology, edited by Ted Benton, 272299 (New York: Guilford Press, 1996); Robin Eckersley, The Green State (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 2004).
12

three, I offer close readings of texts that are outside the usual terrain of political theorizing. And
finally, in a broad political sense, it reminds us that we need not keep beating our heads against
the same wall—that we need not continue to engage in debate merely on the terms of preventing
the encroachment of ideology and bias. Though I am in some sense engaging in that repetition in
this dissertation by examining these claims, my hope is that I will have cleared the ground for at
most a refusal of, and at least an ambivalence toward that practice.
I also draw on and contribute to political theories of neoliberalism.23 Though I do not
develop an original theory of neoliberalism, I do argue that a turn to feminist science studies
offers us a new vantage point from which to see how neoliberal forces shape our lives and
circumscribe what is possible. In making this argument I am indebted to several different
accounts of the neoliberal political imaginary. That neoliberals fostered a representation of
“themselves as freedom fighters,” by way of a “starkly market-libertarian meaning of freedom,
crucially combined with a relentless attack on ‘the social,’” is a key theme throughout chapters
two and three.24 This imaginary, beginning with Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and others,
construes collective sovereignty and solidarity as suspicious endeavors posing a threat to
freedom. That neoliberals saw true human freedom as requiring a discipline governed by reason
and data, not by centralized government planning is crucial to how I read scientific reason as a
tool of structural neoliberal governance and discipline.25 Neoliberals also “saw the promise of a
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more equal world as both threatening to a rational division of labor between an industrial north
and an agricultural south and as inviting economic planning on an even larger scale,”26 which
foregrounds much of their opposition to environmentalism and reluctance to (or rejection of)
responding to climate change as a coordinated global endeavor.
The definition of political neoliberalism I deploy in this dissertation captures the point at
which neoliberal logics infuse a host of other political perspectives, including neoconservatism
and religious fundamentalism—where market fundamentalism as the bottom line political
rationality serves as a way to either sidestep the political-moral questions by appealing to a
rationality that presents itself as neutral to human endeavors (like a positivist scientific
epistemology also does as I elaborate throughout the dissertation), or to bury the political-moral
values beneath this supposed neutrality.27 When members of the political class of climate change
deniers, such as Senator Mike Lee, rely on assertions about the importance of markets for
securing the goods for human flourishing, laced through with their moral commitments to, for
example, a traditional patriarchal familial structure, at the same time as they take up the mantle
of science, they present their values as the ones who do the neutral, rational management of the
status quo. Whether climate denialism takes the form of Vice President Pence acknowledging
that human activities have “some impact” on the planet but cautioning lawmakers to “follow the
science” rather than rush into economic regulations, of former attorney general Jeff Sessions
claiming that carbon is not a pollutant but a “plant food”—or of energy secretary Rock Perry
claiming that, “climate’s changing, always has. Man at this particular point in time is having an
effect on it. How much effect is what’s at debate here. And, more importantly, what is the United
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States going to do to affect that?”—the effect is similar.28 The political rationality at work insists
that freedom can only be secured through market forces, and renders any challenge to this view
as irrational, biased, and unscientific.
Part of the project of this dissertation is to parse out the different ways in which “climate
denialism” operates. In doing so, I somewhat collapse a number of critically divergent ways of
characterizing and diagnosing denialism. Some have argued, for example, that believing that
climate change is a human-propelled crisis is on its own not enough to exempt one from the
charge of denialism.29 Or in other words, that the failure of Americans to adequately hold their
elected representatives accountable for climate action, or to adjust their patterns and practices of
consumption, is itself a form of denialism, regardless of the lip service paid to environmental
concerns. Though I do not take up these definitional questions in this dissertation, as I am preoccupied specifically with what debates about the science signal, I share the view that a broader
characterization of what counts as denialism is likely required for the project of collective action
on climate change. I maintain that careful attention to knowledge practices is a vital contribution
to this project.
Finally, though I do not take up this line of argument explicitly in the dissertation, I
should note that I see the reading I offer here as resonating with a decolonial commitment to
delink the modern distinction between theory and praxis. As Walter Mignolo and Catherine
Walsh argue,
Are you not doing something when you theorize or analyze concepts? Isn’t doing
something praxis? And from praxis—understood as thought-reflection-action, and
thought-reflection on this action—do we not also construct theory and theorize
thought? By disobeying the long-held belief that you first theorize and then apply,
28
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or that you can engage in blind praxis without theoretical analysis and vision, we
locate our thinking/doing in a different terrain…If ‘another world is possible,’ it
cannot be built with the conceptual tools inherited from the Renaissance and the
Enlightenment. It cannot be built with the master’s tools, as Audre Lorde
reminded us a number of years back, ‘for the master’s tools will never dismantle
the master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game,
but they will never enable us to bring about genuine change.’30
I share the view that another world is possible, and in the conclusion of the dissertation I
elaborate at least two examples of ways in which decolonial projects are involved in what I term
reframing the terms of engagement.

Chapter Outline
In chapter one, I ask: How has the study of politics been influenced by these structural
neoliberal arrangements? How has environmental political thought specifically navigated the
science/theory divide? And, what are some lessons from feminist science studies on how to
understand what’s at stake in that methodological division? I argue that a return to Sheldon
Wolin’s debate with the behaviorists in the twentieth century is necessary. Reading Wolin’s
account of the imaginative vision of the theorist alongside Donna Haraway’s critical feminist
account of vision, I argue, should caution environmental political theorists against deference to
scientific knowledge. This chapter lays the groundwork for explaining the role of scientism as a
guardian of structural neoliberal institutional arrangements, and for the investigation of specific
dimensions of political neoliberalism that I take up in the following two chapters.
In chapter two, I ask whether it is the case that climate change denial can be explained as
a function of ignorance about science. Given that white evangelicals in the United States are the
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demographic most likely to report high rates of climate change denial,31 I turn to philosophical
work on epistemologies of ignorance in order to examine the epistemic practices of the
prominent evangelical community leaders who advocate this view. I argue that to position white
evangelicalism as merely anti-intellectual and against science does not capture the dynamic ways
that knowledge is being produced and deployed in this context, nor does it capture all of the
work that images of good science do in sustaining the metaphors and assumptions that infuse
climate change denial as a political orientation in our current context. Instead, I find that
community leaders, in fact, use scientific language and mirror scientific practice in order to cast
climate science as environmentalism, and environmentalism as not science at all, but as a
religion in its own right—one that poses a great threat to the evangelist mission, and thus the
existence of the community. This strategy is made salient through its affinities with political
neoliberalism both materially—the think tanks within which most of the written work on this
view is produced and disseminated are affiliated either in name or monetarily with think tanks
that promote market fundamentalism—and ideologically. At the same time as these community
leaders engage in discursive realignment of evangelicalism with good science, they also tightly
knit interpretations of the bible with the promotion of markets as the way to secure the goods
required to make good on the promise of evangelism. This epistemic formation in turn
reverberates with the broader political imaginary of climate denialism.
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Chapter three asks after the work the charge of “anti-science” does in climate change
debates, and analyzes the lessons learned from feminist responses to this charge. Building on the
analyses of structural and political neoliberalism in the preceding chapters, I argue that feminist
engagements with reason/rationality and objectivity reveal some of the limitations of climate
change discourse in its contemporary manifestations, namely that the “anti-science” charge
serves to uphold the authority of a science whose aims are best pursued by a neutral, rational,
and objective (read: white, western, male) observer. Thus, an embrace of feminist approaches to
science provides alternative frameworks for engaging with climate change deniers that do not
require a commitment to understanding (or preserving an understanding of) science as something
that happens independently of social structures. In particular, I trace the concepts of ideology,
objectivity, and reason as they manifest in each of these debates. I suggest that feminist
engagements with reason and objectivity provide new grounds with which to further public
discussion about climate change, without recourse to a “Truth” about the nature of things that
exists outside of our human attempts to discover it. In particular, feminist accounts that engage
multiple axes of both oppression and analysis—ones that provide grounds complementary to
similar anti-racist, decolonial projects—are crucial for an engagement with an area of science
that straddles, or in some sense reconfigures, the traditional divide between human and nature,
thus in the process reforming its own knowledge practices.
Taken together, these chapters articulate the multiple registers and modalities in which
norms and concepts of science permeate our political debates and our ways of organizing
collective life. Feminist interventions, in turn, reveal that much of what we accept as inevitable
or natural can instead be unmade and remade. In the conclusion, I propose some criteria for a
more imaginative engagement with the questions that arise in the context of climate change and
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the environment. In particular, I argue for broad and adventurous reading practices, playfulness
with our tools for inquiry, and insistence on reclaiming the discursive terms of debate.
Ultimately, the political imaginary best suited to tackle climate change is one that—shorn of
epistemic commitments to neutrality, reason, and objectivity as techniques for management of
the status quo—embraces an approach to knowledge that is plural, embedded, embodied, and
attuned to asymmetries of power.
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Chapter 1
Imaginative Vision in/of Theory: The Theorist in the Anthropocene
“The ultimate weapon of theory, will always be, quite literally, brilliance—that is, enlightening
the facts so that they speak to concerns about which they themselves are mute.”1
“Vision is always a question of the power to see – and perhaps of the violence implicit in our
visualizing practices. With whose blood were my eyes crafted?”2

In the mid 20th century, political theorist Sheldon Wolin warned against the dangers of
methodism in the study of politics. One way to think about Wolin’s warning from the vantage
point of the 21st century, is as a very prescient warning against the dangers not only of what I
refer to throughout the dissertation as structural neoliberalism—but also of the fetishization of
the impartiality of science—for the life of the mind, the production of political knowledge, and
the cultivation of a collective ethos around the question of how we should live. In this chapter, I
lay the groundwork for the following two chapters—each of which investigates aspects of the
political-scientific neoliberal imaginary at work in environmental discourse and debate—by
examining these questions as they unfolded and endure within the discipline of political science.
In particular, I look to how those earlier debates about in what the “science” of political science
consists (as against political theory), have in some ways circumscribed the ability of political
theory to help us to imagine other possibilities for the ordering of collective life in the face of
global climate change.
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This chapter therefore asks, what is the role of the theorist in the age of the
Anthropocene? Immediate tensions arise in unpacking the question—to interrogate the role of
the theorist invites a comparison to the non-theorist, but which? The scientist, practitioner, or
citizen? Where does one draw these lines? To situate the inquiry in the Anthropocene invites
further complications—is the Anthropocene a subject for scientific study? Is it a political object?
Both? Again, are there lines to be drawn? Where, to what end, and by what criteria? This chapter
explores these questions within the context of the developing subfield of environmental political
theory. It asks, how and why, in bringing science together with theory, do environmental
political theorists bridge a much debated divide between the two?
I argue that the way into these questions is through the work of Sheldon Wolin. As the
preeminent 20th century theorist who warned against the dangers of methodism in the study of
politics, Wolin’s work is instructive for delineating the stakes in this context. His advocacy for
an approach to political knowledge that engages what he termed the “imaginative vision” of the
theorist is useful for projects that transcend the disciplinary boundaries that have structured
knowledge production under the rubric of so-called neutrality and objectivity in the post-war
Anglo-American university (concepts about which I say more in chapter three), particularly
projects such as those of an ecological or environmental nature. At the same time, however,
critical approaches to the positivist sciences have proliferated—from post-colonial, feminist,
anti-racist, and other critical perspectives—raising questions about the power dynamics that
hierarchize the neutral sciences over and above other kinds of knowledge. In this chapter, I read
Wolin from this perspective in order to develop an account of vision and of translation
appropriate to the theorist in the Anthropocene. I argue that the feminist demand that scientific
knowledge should be ethically accountable to that which it describes should also be thought of as
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a demand for the theorist of political life – if scientific life is also political in the broadest sense,
then political theorists ought to view scientific knowledge and practice as a realm in which to
practice and play with what Wolin calls the imaginative vision. At the same time, I take heed of
Wolin’s insistence on retaining a sense of the political as something distinct. Where the
Anthropocene redraws categorical boundaries and blurs the distinction between scientific and
political descriptions of the world, environmental political theory (EPT) in turn raises questions
about publics that supersede or transgress identities, questions with which Wolin was deeply
concerned.3
I propose that EPT is uniquely poised to enact a somewhat updated version of Wolin’s
conceptualization of vision, one that is indebted to science studies, where vision is understood as
partial, as a process of translation, as an exercise in imagination, and as grounded in the margins.
In what follows, I argue that revisiting the figures of “the theorist” and “the scientist” is crucial
for political questions as they manifest in response to the challenges of our current global
predicament—namely, global climate change and its relationship to unfettered neoliberal
capitalism. This in a sense means, as Mark B. Brown has argued, that “by opening up the local
construction of scientific facts to critical examination, political theorists can help citizens
respond to the interactions between scientific practices and matters of general concern.”4 But it
also means that contending with practices of knowing generally should be part of the project to,
as Wendy Brown puts it, insist on the political.5 Or put another way, that contending with the
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local construction of scientific facts should be thought of as its own terrain for political
theorizing and as of core concern to navigating political theory’s own inter/intra-actions,
conflicts, and collusions with science(s), including the technical, economic, and social sciences.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section examines some recent trends in
environmental political theory, particularly regarding its relationship to climate science. It is
common to encounter scholarship under the auspices of EPT that spends extensive time
discussing climate science as a way into a set of political problems or questions. Following
Wolin, I argue that this mode of engaging science shares some methodological features with the
form of methodism with which Wolin was concerned. In particular, that it is deferential to the
descriptions of the world authorized through the scientific method, and as such somewhat
beholden to the status quo. The second section turns to Wolin’s debates with the behavioralists in
the 1960s, where I parse out both his critique of methodism, as well as his account of the kind of
political knowledge that theory produces, as against the kind of political knowledge that
behavioralism produces. I argue that he should be understood as cautioning the theorist against
this deference to the knowledge produced by scientific criteria. The third section turns to the
work of feminist scholar Donna Haraway, in order to ground Wolin’s account of the imaginative
vision of the theorist in the feminist critique of science, and in feminist debates over the concept
of vision. I argue that where Wolin was optimistic about the role of theory to “enlighten” the
facts, as in the quote from the epigraph of this chapter, Haraway asks us to understand facts not
as mute to the concerns of the contexts in which they emerge, but as inextricably bound in them.
This is not to say that science and theory should both be thought of as similarly constructed all
the way down, but rather that political theory has both an obligation to and a unique perspective
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on questions regarding power and domination in technologies of seeing—whether these
technologies are political, scientific, or both.

Environmental Political Theory and the Scientific Imagination
Environmental political theory takes many shapes, but two broad approaches to
ecological challenges are of interest here. The first is to ask something like: what resources can
we mine from our “epic theorists” (following Wolin) to help us understand our current
predicament?6 The second strategy asks something like: how do we revise or deploy our political
theories and concepts in light of our current predicament?7 The efforts in response to the first
question generally take up one of two directions. Theorists will ask questions about how the
histories of concepts like human, nature, and world in the various theories we have inherited can
help to clarify and reframe how we ought to understand what our predicaments are, or from
where they originate. Theorists will also ask how our understandings of political crises can be
applied to ecological crises—to what extent are ecological crises also crises of justice,
democracy, or participation, for example. This second kind of question sometimes dovetails with
the question of revising our political theories and concepts. If ecological crises are to an extent
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crises of democracy or participation, how then ought we to reformulate our political concepts to
address these crises?8 Scholarship in this vein deals with concerns about responsibility,
distribution, coordination, and other ethical/procedural considerations.
Within these two broad approaches, I locate two modes of engagement with climate
science. The first I characterize as the mining of climate science for the pursuit of political theory
projects – scholars begin with the science of climate change (reduction of biodiversity,
atmospheric calculation, carbon storage, etc.), and revise or extend political concepts in light of
this scientific research. Ecological modernization, environmental economics, green liberalism,
market environmentalism, sustainable development, and growth/degrowth debates are all
examples of this current.9 The second I characterize as a more critical engagement with science
(often emanating from the critical theory tradition) – these scholars ask to what extent
ecological/environmental issues are also social/political problems of domination/exploitation,
and what can critical theory tell us about our current predicaments? Biocentrism, bioregionalism,
deep ecology, eco-feminism, eco-socialism, environmental justice, and social ecology generally
fall under this current.10 My interest in returning to Wolin in this context is primarily in response
to projects of the first type—the mining of climate science for the pursuit of political theory
projects. I argue that when political theorists either attempt to develop or refine political theories
that are empirically testable within the contexts of climate change, or to engage the political
landscape of the development of climate science and climate response, they may also be limiting
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the capacity of political theory to help us make sense of the incoherence and contradictoriness of
experiences that characterize the landscape of both ecological challenges and the study of them.
Consider two examples: Steve Vanderheiden’s 2008 book Atmospheric Justice: A
Political Theory of Climate Change; and Dale Jamieson’s 2014 book Reason in a Dark Time:
Why the Struggle Against Climate Change Failed – And What it Means for our Future. In each
case, the scholar in question is trained in the tradition of political theory or political philosophy,
attempts to offer a rigorous philosophical account of our current predicament, and gestures
toward a series of potential solutions to address this predicament. Notably, each book begins
with an extensive treatment of the landscape of climate science. Jamieson notes in his preface, “I
am a philosopher by disciplinary training but some of my colleagues will have a hard time
recognizing this as a philosophy book. I can only say when it comes to thinking about the real
world (an exercise in what philosophers call ‘non-ideal theory’), the facts matter. So does
history. It is important to situate the subject under investigation in the world of our shared
experiences.”11 The first substantive chapter of the book goes on to situate the nature of the
problem (global failure to respond to climate change) in the transition from the development of
climate science, to climate change as a public issue and area of diplomacy. The second chapter
explores the extent to which scientific ignorance and the politicization of science have played a
role in establishing “obstacles to action.”12
Vanderheiden’s book opens with a chapter entitled, “the politics of climate change
mitigation,” as a way of introducing a problem to which he goes on to offer six different
theoretical frameworks for exploring, including: a doctrine of fairness; international justice;

11
12

Jamieson, Reason, ix.
Ibid 61; I respond to this argument specifically in chapter 2.
26

intergenerational justice; and three different frameworks for distributing responsibility.
Revealingly, this introduction is not just a history of climate change policy, but rather a history
of the relationship between the scientific discovery of the greenhouse gas effect and the
subsequent political landscape in which this discovery was either dealt with or not. Early on in
the chapter he notes:
Before continuing our examination of global climate policy development, we
might briefly examine the current state of scientific knowledge as assessed and
disseminated by the first four IPCC assessment reports, laying out the basics of
what we now know about the causes and likely consequences of anthropogenic
climate change. The primary controversies within climate science today concern
not the existence of what Arrhenius called the ‘hothouse’—the heat-trapping
effects of atmospheric GHGs and the anthropogenic causes of their increased
atmospheric concentrations are no longer genuine controversies—but instead
what the various effects of higher atmospheric concentrations of the various
GHGs are likely to be. I examine some of those predicted effects below, and later
consider in greater detail the proper role played by the remaining scientific
uncertainty surrounding some of those effects, but first I briefly review the current
state of scientific knowledge about the problem.13
The chapter then goes on to distill extensive scientific conclusions regarding the role that fossil
fuels play in raising the earth’s average surface temperatures, effects on global sea levels, and
shifts in plant flowering, bird breeding, and insect emerging seasons, among other things.
My question is, what should we learn from this phenomenon where a political theorist
must develop a fluency, or at minimum a proficiency, in the language, methods, and debates of
climate science in order to ask and answer questions about the politics at stake in this landscape?
On one hand, it gestures to the deep imbrication of political and scientific knowledge required to
give a better account of our world, particularly in the ecological context; or put differently, it
suggests that ecological “objects” are constituted through both scientific and political practices.
On the other hand, there is a way in which political knowledge of a theoretical nature often
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defers to scientific knowledge in this context. For Vanderheiden, the contestation over predicted
effects of higher atmospheric concentrations of GHGs is prerequisite background for the account
of atmospheric justice—the force of the political claim/project relies on the accuracy and nuance
of the science. For Jamieson, the failure to respond to climate change is essentially a failure to
either understand or to take heed of the science—where politics intrudes is after the science, as it
were. Is there anything lost in this deference? I argue that Wolin’s defense of the kind of
knowledge that political theory produces serves as, at minimum, a cautionary note for this
practice.

Sheldon Wolin vs. the Behavioralists
In his famous 1969 essay “Political Theory as a Vocation,” Wolin set out to examine
what he saw as the “primacy of method in the study of politics,”14 as a way to think through the
relationship between the “behavioral revolution” in political science in general and the subfield
of more “traditional” and historical political theory. Working against the backdrop of the
professionalization of the discipline – the American Political Science Association’s original
grant of the relationship between political theory and political science relied on an insistence that
the value of political theorizing was as a conceptual resource for the impartial analysis of
political phenomena – Wolin was concerned over the ability of the discipline to adequately and
effectively evaluate and challenge the status quo. The APSA constitution, for example, explicitly
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stipulated that the association would “not assume a partisan position upon any question of
practical politics.”15
Wolin ultimately argued that the preference for this version of methodism contributed to
a lamentable impoverishment of the study of politics and of political knowledge. His argument
hinged on three important moves that bear mention for the current discussion—a discussion of
the history of the idea of method, with a particular focus on the intellectual relationship between
Descartes and the contemporary methodists; an analysis of how “method” is deployed
specifically by the behavioralists; and finally, a reading of the way that knowledge produced
through methodism differs in substance and reach from that of political theory. Taken together,
these moves contextualize his skepticism of the preference for a form of political knowledge that
is characterized by the “search for rigorous formulations which are logically consistent and
empirically testable,”16 over a form of political knowledge that is mindful more so of the
“incoherence and contradictoriness of experience.”17
For Wolin, Descartes is the intellectual figure that on one hand offers a philosophical
account of the stakes of the current conflict between bios theoretikos and vita methodica in the
study of politics, and on the other hand demonstrates the paradox of this conflict. Whereas for
the Greeks, and well into the Middle Ages, philosophia and theoria were in the business of truthseeking while methodus was in the business of ordering that which was already known—for
Descartes, the significance of method extended well beyond the “simple advantages of economy
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and efficiency of mental effort.”18 Wolin reads Descartes as conceiving of method as a form of
discipline to prime the mind for its truth-seeking efforts. At issue in Descartes’ preference for
rational method over inherited knowledge, for Wolin, is the way in which this preference renders
its political commitments as neutral and thus as rational. When Descartes aligns the most
moderate morals with a rational methodism, the political status quo and existing arrangements
are taken to be the expression of what is most reasonable. Wolin argues that the state of political
science in the wake of the behavioral revolution employs a similar justificatory mechanism.
“Despite occasional deference paid to ‘the tradition of political theory,’ there is a widely shared
belief that the tradition was largely unscientific where it was not antiscientific and that the
defining characteristic of a scientific revolution is to break with the past.”19 For Wolin, the
danger here is that the political scientist will tend to follow the path of marking what already
exists “the most moderate” (and consequently the most reasonable), thus utterly foreclosing a
“genuinely theoretical” discussion that might levy critical questions and reflections on the
existing system as a whole.20
For Wolin, the behavioralists in the study of politics were guilty of both a historical
inaccuracy, and of a political transgression. Where the behavioralists heralded themselves as the
harbingers of a scientific revolution in method, Wolin argued that they misunderstood the
significance of their own revolutionary project. The preference for behavioralism alone was
hardly a paradigm shift in the study of politics, but the insistence on behavioral explanations as
expressive of a scientific project was indeed quite influential as it rendered the scientific study of
politics as the new definition of the vocation, including imbuing it with what was considered to
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be the ethic of science: “objectivity, detachment, fidelity to fact, and deference to intersubjective
verification by a community of practitioners.”21 The problem of this approach is two-fold on
Wolin’s view. On one hand, it lets the scholar of politics off the hook for offering either a critical
analysis, commitment, or choices regarding the “quality, direction, or fate of public life.”22 On
the other, it authorizes the view from nowhere in a way that is antithetical to political life and
practice. He argues, “the alleged neutrality of a methodist’s training overlooks significant
philosophical assumptions admittedly incorporated into the outlook of those who advocate
scientific inquiry into politics…for the employment of method assumes, even requires, that the
world be of one kind rather than another if techniques are to be effective.”23 This means that the
questions a methodist can ask are limited to a search for regularities, patterns, and predictions—
again, leaving incoherence and contradictoriness in experience, at least unaccounted for, at most
as hostile to the relevant epistemic criteria.
Wolin’s intervention into debates over behavioralism was in a sense foregrounding some
of the later debates in the discipline about situating theory in the practice of inquiry, following
discussions in philosophy of science proper about in what science consists, and how science
develops.24 The development of theoretical realism, for example, is precisely illustrative of his
concern that theory would be limited to merely a set of tools for the description of empirical
phenomena. The attribution of theories’ failure to correspond with or to effectively capture
empirical phenomena as a problem-in-theory rather than a problem-in-world, in part explains the
proliferation of subfields of or designations within political theory, in addition to explaining the
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relegation of certain theories to other, non-theoretical, subfields of political science (e.g. IR
theory in the subfield of international relations).25 The strength of theorizing as Wolin
understands it—which he also refers to as “tacit political knowledge” borrowing from Karl
Polanyi—is that it is not beholden to the criteria of operationalization, and as such can and
should be directed toward that which is politically appropriate.

Situated Knowledges and the Vision of the Theorist
In a now-classic essay published in 1988, feminist scholar Donna Haraway invoked
debates about scientific objectivity constituting the emerging field of feminist science studies to
offer her own conceptualization of “situated knowledges.” Situated knowledges, she argued,
require and encourage a self that is contradictory and split, one who can interrogate positionings,
as well as require that the objects of knowledge be pictured as interactive actors and/or agents,
rather than passive and enslaved (to the truth of the world, or to the observer). At the outset of
the essay, Haraway formulates the problem, to which situated knowledges responds, as follows:
So, I think my problem, and ‘our’ problem, is how to have simultaneously an
account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing
subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own ‘semiotic technologies’ for
making meanings, and a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’
world, one that can be partially shared and that is friendly to earthwide projects of
finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and
limited happiness.”26
And further down, “Natural, social, and human sciences have always been
implicated in hopes like these. Science has been about a search for translation,
25

Sheldon Wolin, “Political Theory”; Sheldon Wolin and John Schaar, “Review: Essays on the
Scientific Study of Politics.” American Political Science Review 57, no. 1 (March 1963): 125150; John G. Gunnell, “Realizing Theory: The Philosophy of Science Revisited.” The Journal of
Politics 57, no. 4 (Nov 1995): 923-940; Bruno Latour, “The Impact of Science Studies on
Political Philosophy,” Science, Technology, and Human Values 16, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 3-19.
Mark B. Brown, “Conceptions of Science.”
26
Donna J. Haraway, “Situated Knowledges,” 579.
32

convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality – which I call reductionism
only when one language (guess whose?) must be enforced as the standard for all
translations and conversions. What money does in the exchange orders of
capitalism, reductionism does in the powerful mental orders of global sciences.
There is, finally, only one equation. That is the deadly fantasy that feminists and
others have identified in some versions of objectivity, those in the service of
hierarchical and positivist orderings of what can count as knowledge.27
What are the implications for political theory as Wolin understands it of Haraway’s injunction to
hold on one hand, an account of knowledges’ historical contingencies (including the preferred
modes for asking and answering questions about the world in a given time) alongside, on the
other, a commitment to shared political projects of emancipation (broadly construed and
multivalent)? Haraway proposes a version of feminist objectivity for science that I argue reflects
shared concerns with Wolin’s theorist. On one reading, Haraway’s assessment of the problem
facing feminists over how to engage critiques of critiques of objectivity already sounds familiar
to the theorist working in the tradition of Wolin. “Traditional” political theory is rife with
interpretations and translations of thinkers and phenomena embedded in particular moments in
time, and debates over how/whether to extend certain works, insights, and conclusions into our
own moments and contexts, and for various political projects. However, I argue that Haraway’s
formulation of the problem of the science question in feminism is most important for revisiting
the metaphor of vision for the theorist. Haraway’s call to the theorist should be understood as to
attend to collective historical subjectivity, and at the same time to hold oneself accountable to the
limits of the sensory system of vision—put differently, to think of the “we” and the “here” of the
political world as not just a subject to be theorized, but as actively entangled in question-asking
itself. And further, she asks of the theorist to be responsible to the situated nature of inquiry—to
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actively resist/reject the view from nowhere. In what follows, I explore the consequences of this
entreaty for environmental political theory.
Haraway argues that the problem of “objectivity” for feminist inquiry is at once a
problem of paranoid fantasy, while at the same time highlights a common feature of the
dynamic, heterogeneous, and overlapping sciences (exact, physical, natural, social, political,
biological, and human)—that feature being a concern with the faithfulness of our accounts to a
“real world,” leaving aside how mediated or contested both “real” and “world” may be.28 And
yet this feminist paranoia about the exclusivity of the objectivity project is also real. It is all too
clear that the form of detached objectivity lauded as the achievement of Western progress in
scientific thinking is specific and partial, not inevitable and universal after all. Haraway notes
that feminists have often been trapped between the two poles of on one end, revealing the
historical contingency of objectivity, and on the other, of searching for a real account of the
world—or in other words, finding themselves stuck between choosing a radical social
constructionist view, or searching for a feminist version of objectivity. Haraway offers her
account as a way to intervene in the dispute between these two poles.29 The problem with the
radical constructivist view, as Haraway tells it, is that it carries its own mechanisms of
reductionism. “The strong program in the sociology of knowledge joins with the lovely and nasty
tools of semiology and deconstruction to insist on the rhetorical nature of truth, including
scientific truth. History is a story Western culture buffs tell each other; science is a contestable
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text and a power field; the content is the form. Period.”30 Put another way, when everything is
always and only rhetorically seeking or codifying power, the ability to say anything meaningful
about the world comes into question. On the flip side, those who sought a feminist objectivity or
feminist empiricism found themselves needing to overly align with the existing theories of
science. “Here, we, as feminists, find ourselves perversely conjoined with the discourse of many
practicing scientists, who, when all is said and done, mostly believe they are describing and
discovering things by means of all their constructing and arguing.”31 In other words, feminists
insist on some use for objectivity such that scientists who have not thought about the historical
contingency of knowledge production are then let off the hook—it never becomes necessary to
interrogate the practices of domination and patterns of privilege and oppression that constitute
(or have constituted) their own constructions and arguments. That particular contingency, the
replication of domination and oppression, is left unexposed.
So, here we are – stuck between radical social construction and feminist objectivity, or
between not saying anything “real” about the world and not giving an adequate account of
domination and oppression – when we encounter Haraway’s proposal from the outset of this
section. Haraway suggests that in order to hold on to these commitments that seem to be
contradicting and irresolvable, and to avoid conceptualizing these commitments as binary
oppositions, we revisit and reclaim the metaphor of vision. While the “gaze” recalls to the ears of
feminists the sound of the “unmarked positions of Man and White,”32 insisting on the embodied
nature of the sensory system of vision marks, and thus locates this gaze in the sciences of
militarism, capitalism, and colonialism. Haraway proposes that we consider the proliferating
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technologies for seeing, as well as for learning about the different ways that eyes function, as an
allegory for a feminist version of objectivity. “All these pictures of the world should not be
allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability but of elaborate specificity and difference
and the loving care people might take to learn how to see faithfully from another’s point of view,
even when the other is our own machine.”33 So, part of what we’re up to then when we engage
with the knowledge produced by and through sciences and their technologies (including political
and social sciences and technologies), is to consider the “how” of seeing, and how then what is
seen is mediated (or translated) through those visual technologies and processes.
Importantly for Haraway, even when we are not talking about sex/gender and the body,
this is a specifically feminist project in two respects. It is feminist in so far as it rejects any
particular standpoint as the ultimate ground. “There is no single feminist standpoint because our
maps require too many dimensions for that metaphor to ground our visions. But the feminist
standpoint theorists’ goal of an epistemology and politics of engaged, accountable positioning
remains eminently potent. The goal is better accounts of the world, that is, ‘science.’”34 And it is
also feminist in so far as it resists dominating the object of study. “Feminists, and others who
have been the most active as critics of the sciences and their claims or associated ideologies,
have shied away from doctrines of scientific objectivity in part because of the suspicion that an
‘object’ of knowledge is a passive and inert thing. Accounts of such objects can seem to be either
appropriations of a fixed and determined world reduced to resource for instrumentalist projects
of destructive Western societies, or they can be seen as masks for interests, usually dominating
interests.”35 This concern, to both give a better account of the world at the same time as attending
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to practices of domination in knowledge production, is a concern that environmental political
theorists should also heed. We should think of the goals of this standpoint as follows: to produce
accountable political knowledge about our ecological predicament that is embodied and multiply
situated, that actively resists Western modes of domination and oppression (including of nature),
and that is usable for the projects of, as Haraway puts it, “finite freedom, adequate material
abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness.”36 We should also ask what
other mechanisms of vision are complementary to these projects, especially in so far as the
conditions that constrain each are complex, material, and overlapping.
It is worth noting that Haraway’s injunction to reclaim vision is not without controversy.
Metaphors related to vision have appeared and been critiqued in many kinds of scholarship and
political projects. Perception, recognition, witnessing, blindness, theater, and spectators are
critical metaphors one encounters across both philosophy and political theory, for example.37
What I have in mind here in returning to vision, though, is primarily a methodological concern
whose political insights, as Wolin argues, “depend for its richness on the resources from which it
can draw.”38 This is a concern I argue that feminist science studies and environmental political
theory share. To the extent that environmental political theory is consumed with the dual task of
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on one hand, giving a better account of the world, and on the other, generating prospects for a
better future, Haraway’s call is crucial for situating the theorist in relation to the scientist.
I suggest here that reclaiming vision in the way Haraway suggests helps to sharpen
Wolin’s use specifically as political theory engages questions of time, place, and world history in
the environmental context.39 My use of “world history” here follows a problematic set up by
Wendy Brown in a 2002 essay entitled “At the Edge.”40 Brown argues that one of the difficulties
facing political theory at the turn of the 21st century lies in the proliferation of “forces” and
“orders of existence” that challenge the boundedness and autonomy of the political. Political
actors, institutions, identities, and problems are increasingly shaped by that which was once
marked as outside the political—“economics, culture, nature, the bodily, the domestic, the social,
the civil, and the local.”41 Where world history and political theory collide then, is over the
question of whether the Western canon’s understanding of itself as transcending history renders
it irrevocably of the past (this question is especially potent for environmental political theorists.)
Brown is concerned about the ways in which these world historical developments have corroded
and dispersed the political. She calls for “deliberate and careful transgression, risk, and
interdisciplinary adventurousness”42 in order to recuperate the political by “cultivating a political
orientation for our work, foregrounding concern with the question of how collective life is
ordered, what power and possibilities it harbors, what prospects exist for advancing the values
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we argue that it should feature.”43 An embodied and situated account of vision, following
Haraway’s invocation, seeks to do just that.
Wolin articulated the vision of/in political theory in its relations with what he called
“political space.” Because political philosophers have deployed metaphysical terms such as
“time,” “space,” “reality,” or “energy,” without reference to the world of natural phenomena, we
should think of them as engaging in a conversation about the contours and specificities of
political time and political space.44 The tight relationship between a distinctive identity and a
geographical space, for example, had been foundational for the evolution of political and
national consciousnesses. Wolin argues that we might think of all political theories as
reorganizing space in so far as they work to structure public life in a particular way, or in so far
as they view public life as already structured in a particular way. For him, the varied conceptions
of political space throughout political philosophy are an indicator that each theorist brings “a
particular angle of vision” to bear on delineating and elucidating the political world.45 Though he
links the angle of vision to the theorists’ location (“where the viewer ‘stands’”),46 the standpoint
differs from the feminist standpoint in Haraway’s work. Similarly to Haraway, however, Wolin
ties the descriptive and the imaginative tightly together under the rubric of vision, though
Haraway delineates this difference as the rational and the imaginary.47
For Wolin, coupling the descriptive and imaginative aspects of vision together bears on
the relationship of political philosophy to natural philosophy/natural sciences in the wake of the
scientific revolution(s) of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The imaginative element is
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required of the observer to politics, differently than the observer of the natural world, particularly
as this observer is preoccupied with the meaning of political life and arrangements. That Wolin
saw the absence of imaginative vision as problem for the scientific study of politics, but not of
the natural world, is a key point for turning to Haraway in the context of the Anthropocene.
But for Wolin, the imaginative is not “merely a methodological convenience which
enabled the theorist to handle his materials more effectively.”48 The imaginative vision has been
“the medium for expressing the fundamental values of the theorist; it has been the means by
which the political theorist has sought to transcend history.”49 For Wolin, this is an expression of
the theorist’s dealings in possibility. While theorists are trying to describe the world as it is, the
generalizations they make do not allow them to offer exact predictions (such as ones generated
by the laws of physics, for example). But in so far as they do engage in “posting warning,”
theorists are also stating “the necessary or sufficient conditions for attaining ends which, for one
reason or another, are deemed good or desirable.”50 Here is, I think, where Haraway’s call is
most instructive.
Where Wolin sees the theorist’s attempt to transcend history, Haraway cautions us
against knowledge that purports to be everywhere and nowhere. She rejects the conceptual
framing of relativism and objective scientific authority as opposite poles of knowledge. On her
view, both are knowledges of dislocation. The theorist has an obligation then to deal in vision
(both descriptive and imaginative) that is grounded in position(s) in time and place. Insofar as the
theorist is occupied with reorganizing political space, she has an obligation to seek out the
view(s) from outside and from below. Where Wolin argues that because the field of politics is
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radically created, reducing political knowledge to the facts of political life is a circular
procedure, Haraway asks us to also be mindful of the deep historic link between reductionism
and domination and oppression. She instructs us to ask, “with whose blood were my eyes
crafted?”51
For the environmental political theorist, these issues become all the more acute given our
current ecological challenges. How and from where do we locate the kinds of vision we need to
understand our current predicament, and to insist on its relationship to the political and to the
communal (to offer an account of collective life)? Consider an example. In the introduction to a
collection of essays entitled Engaging Nature: Environmentalism and the Political Theory
Canon, the editors sketch out the aims of environmental political theory as follows:
“Environmental political theory aims at a deeper understanding of human relations with the rest
of nature, challenges mainstream political theory to recognize environmental concerns,
challenges environmental ethics to consider political and social context, and interrogates the
often unexamined assumptions and conclusions of environmental activists. While generally
sympathetic to the aims of the environmental movement, environmental political theorists are not
bound by these goals and try to prioritize intellectual rigor above ideological commitment.”52 It
is noteworthy that only the environmental activists are guilty of having unexamined assumptions
and conclusions! But this is a revealing mission statement for environmental political theory in
other ways as well. It is possible to imagine a biologist, an environmental scientist, or even a
physicist as offering an account of their work as driving toward a deeper understanding of human
relations with the natural world. There is nothing that claims that task as unique to the theorist,
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except insofar as it is coupled with explicit challenges both to other political theorists in general
and to philosophers of ethics--another feature of the entrenchment of disciplinarity. Further, to
task oneself with the interrogation of unexamined assumptions and conclusions could just as well
be the mandate of both the scientist and the philosopher of science. It is clear that there is
something about the knowledge process generally—as well as specifically knowledge about
nature—that is of interest to the environmental political theorist. Perhaps we might instead
conceive of the goals and conclusions of environmental activists as one of many feminist
standpoints—not to be dispatched to the realm of ideological commitment, but to be one place
from which we can engage in the processes of translation. Translation that is “always
interpretive, critical, and partial”—“a ground for conversation, rationality, and objectivity, which
is power-sensitive, not ‘pluralist.’”53 Translation that is also the work of the theorist.
Though I engage less explicitly with environmental political theorists in the following
two chapters, I offer each as an example of the kind of work that takes up the call that I read
Wolin and Haraway as sounding. In each, I track the ways that various methodological and
epistemic criteria (norms and concepts of science) attach to, foreground, or cloak a variety of
ethical/political formations which, on one hand seek to preserve the status quo, and on the other,
fail to adequately challenge it.
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Chapter 2
Doomsayers & Cornucopians: Calvin Beisner, Evangelical Environmentalism, and
Epistemologies of Ignorance
In 1993, the newly established Evangelical Environmental Network published the
“Evangelical Declaration of the Care of Creation,” explicitly advocating a response to climate
change grounded in an evangelical obligation to care for the environment as part of God’s
creation. Seven years later, a conservative organization called the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance
offered a counter declaration for environmental stewardship, arguing that the God-given right of
dominion over the earth is best secured through free markets. By the late-2000s, Richard Cizik
(former President of the National Association of Evangelicals and a climate activist) had
resigned from his post amid pressure from right-leaning Christian leaders; evangelical Senator
Lindsay Graham had reversed his call for bipartisan climate action in the Senate claiming he was
no longer persuaded by the science, and Pat Robertson (a prominent right-leaning evangelical
leader, whose support for action against global warming was considered by the media to be highprofile) had withdrawn his support for climate action, declaring climate change a hoax.1 While
an evangelical environmentalist movement persists, white evangelicals in the United States are
more likely to doubt that global climate change is caused by human activities, to believe that
there is broad disagreement among scientists on this issue, and to generally distrust scientists
than any other demographic in the United States.2
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This chapter examines whether ignorance about science is an adequate explanation for
evangelical contestations over environmentalism and climate science. It asks, what are the
epistemic practices deployed by these community leaders? What can we learn about knowledge
and ignorance from examining the modes through which doubt, disagreement, and distrust
operate in this context? And in particular, what do these modes tell us about the role that
knowledge practices play in establishing membership in groups? This conservative backlash
against evangelical environmentalism—while claiming stewardship of the earth as its own stated
goal—takes a decidedly neoliberal bent at the same time as it encourages skepticism of climate
science. The loudest and most powerful voices of this contingent share several features: venues,
tactics, and constituencies with the scientists who traffic in doubt,3 are the most conservative
political representatives who regularly appear alongside the pundits of Fox News and Breitbart,
and have partnerships with the researchers at conservative think tanks like the Heritage
Foundation and the Cato Institute. The Cornwall Alliance, one of the key players spurring the
retrenchment of evangelical environmentalism, defines its own mission as the combined
promotion of biblical earth stewardship and economic development of the world’s poor. This
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chapter seeks to understand how neoliberalism and evangelicalism come together in the service
of knowledge claims that challenge and resist scientific consensus.
Making sense – to use the phrase somewhat playfully – of knowledge is difficult to do in
this situation. There are competing kinds of knowledge being deliberated, as well as different
grounds for truth claims and justificatory practices to consider—scientific knowledge, political
knowledge, economic knowledge, and theological knowledge are but a few variations one
encounters. And, it is additionally difficult to trace the relationship between these kinds of
knowledge and individual knowers. Are the majority white evangelicals who are skeptical of the
science of climate change simply lacking knowledge in scientific literacy? Willfully refusing?
Something else altogether? As we saw in the previous chapter, the argument that the political
deadlock on an adequate response to the threat of climate change can be explained by ignorance
about the science is made in environmental political thought both implicitly (through the
demonstration of how a clarification of the science can help us to refine our political responses),
and explicitly, as in the case of Dale Jamieson’s book.4 In this chapter, I argue that
epistemologies of ignorance offer crucial tools to refine this argument. To understand the active
production of ignorance as a feature of group subjectivity and self-construction (but not
necessarily as an articulated position consciously shared by each member of the community)
explains the retrenchment of the evangelical environmentalist movement not as a function of
individual ignorance conceived of as lack of scientific literacy, but helps to contextualize it in
evangelicalism’s affiliations with neoliberalism, and is therefore instructive for political projects
that seek to dismantle this knowledge/ignorance regime. At the same time, I also argue that
ignorance about climate change is distinctive, and differs from other forms of group-based

4

Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time.
45

ignorance, such as western ignorance about colonialism or white ignorance about racial
oppression.5
My analysis of this conservative evangelical “environmentalism”—the backlash to the
original environmentalist push—and its epistemic practices proceeds through a close reading of
the work of Calvin Beisner, in part because Beisner sits at the nexus of evangelical leadership,
conservative think tanks, and conservative media outlets. Beisner, once a professor of social
ethics at Knox Theological Seminary, had a hand in forming the Interfaith Stewardship Alliance,
and in its subsequent transformation into the Cornwall Alliance, which to this day acts as a
research-producing coordination hub between economic conservatives, climate change skeptics,
and evangelicals. Beisner is the designated public face of this conservative evangelical effort,
serves as its spokesperson on various radio programs, and is a prolific writer, his website
boasting 12 books written, 30 edited, and 35 contributed to, in addition to “thousands” of both
popular and scholarly articles published.6 He was hailed as “the leading evangelical climatechange skeptic” in a 2006 issue of Baptists Today,7 has written several books specifically on
environmentalism and economics,8 and designed the Cornwall Alliance’s 12-part DVD series
“Resisting the Green Dragon” in addition to delivering two of its lectures.9 The Cornwall
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Alliance blog currently features new posts from Beisner every week on topics from biodiversity
to natural disasters, and he has sponsored and signed numerous petitions and declarations hosted
on the site, including ones entitled “Forget ‘climate change’, energy empowers the poor!” and “A
call to protect the unborn and the pro-life movement from environmentalist deceit: a declaration
by concerned pro-lifers.” In 2014, the Heritage Foundation awarded him the “Outstanding
Spokesperson on Faith, Science, and Stewardship” award at their 9th International Climate
Change Conference. Beisner is a particularly salient figure for the deftness with which he folds
claims about knowledge and science into claims about what it means to be evangelical, such that
untangling them becomes quite complicated. His partnerships, visibility, and authority in the
community (both self-proclaimed and asserted by others) allow me to trace what is at stake from
the evangelical perspective. Following a designation suggested by sociologist Lydia Bean, we
might think of Beisner as a “general” of the conservative-evangelical culture war.10 Though
Evangelicals certainly hold a wide range of views regarding climate change, cues from in-group
elites undoubtedly have ways of working themselves into local sermons and congregations, as
evidenced by the rate at which evangelicals are more likely than the general American
population to believe that there is no scientific consensus on climate change.11 Part of
understanding how the positions that these generals hand down to their local-level captains and
opinion-leaders work themselves into groups’ political positions (e.g. skepticism about a
scientific consensus on climate change, or doubt regarding the necessity of a political response to
it) involves examining the way that these positions are crafted both as and against knowledge. I
argue that the success of Beisner’s political strategy lies in both his entwined dynamic of
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appropriating and imitating science, while simultaneously rejecting it, as well as his careful
casting of the problem as in the end not about the environment at all, but rather about how much
ground evangelicalism can afford to cede to systems of secular governance.
This chapter proceeds in three parts. The first section develops an account of this version
of the conservative evangelical “social imaginary,” building primarily from the work of political
theorist William Connolly and philosopher Lorraine Code. This social imaginary—constituted
by the joining together of right-wing Christianity and capitalism—forms a rich intellectual
tradition of which Beisner is an active participant, and serves as the backdrop for the reading
offered here of his environmental thought and epistemic practice. The second section turns to
scholarship in philosophy on the epistemology of ignorance—tracing various accounts of the
ways in which white supremacy, colonialism, and patriarchy have produced ignorance (or devalued knowledge) about such topics as non-white people and cultures, indigenous knowledges
about nature and language, and non-male bodies and experience. Drawing from these accounts,
the section proposes a set of criteria for understanding skepticism about climate change as
dynamically entangled with the construction of white evangelical group identity and belonging.
The third section turns to a close reading of Calvin Beisner’s rebuttals against both the
evangelical environmentalist movements in the 90s, as well as his continued refusal of a more
secular, political environmentalism. I argue that he makes three moves that are epistemically
relevant: his continual insistence that a rational debate must proceed from evidence; the coupling
of market language with biblical exegesis; and the construction of a group identity rooted in a
commitment to an evangelical truth and worldview, and action in the world that proceeds from
both. Taken together, these moves ground a sense of belonging in an evangelical community—
one which requires skepticism of a certain realm of scientific knowledge at the same time that it
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claims to celebrate some of science’s epistemic criteria, while also entangling this skepticism
with a belief in the principles of the “free” market. The chapter concludes by arguing that to
position white evangelicalism as merely anti-intellectual and against science does not capture the
dynamic ways that knowledge is being produced and deployed in this context. Nor does it
capture all of the work that images of good science do in sustaining the metaphors and
assumptions that infuse climate change denial as a political orientation in our current context.
Part of the bind that Beisner spins for his readers hinges precisely on obscuring that which he
ostensibly sets out to explain. He uses scientific language to cast climate science as
environmentalism, and environmentalism as not science at all, but as a religion in its own right—
one that poses a great threat to the evangelist mission.

Cowboy Capitalism and Right-wing Evangelicalism’s Social Imaginary
To understand white evangelical climate change denial as an epistemic practice, it is crucial to
examine what William Connolly has called the “capitalist-evangelical resonance machine.”12
Calvin Beisner should be understood as a participant in the resonance machine, and
epistemologies of ignorance in turn offer an account of how this machine works. His arguments
about knowledge gain traction when they resonate with the images, metaphors, and affects that
the machine assembles for the collective.
For Connolly, the resonances between the right edge of Christianity and capitalism
become visible when you track the affects and intensities of both contemporary evangelical
formations, and what he calls today’s “cowboy capitalism”—or in other words, when you track
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the affects and intensities between evangelical teachings and practices, and a belief in
unregulated markets. He writes,
the partners to the resonance machine in question have an existential orientation
that encourages them to transfigure interest into greed, greed into anti-market
ideology, anti-market ideology into market manipulation, market manipulation
into state institutionalization of these operations, and the entire complex into
policies to pull the security net away from ordinary workers, consumers, and
retirees—some of whom are then set up to translate new intensities of resentment
and cynicism into participation in the machine. Above all, individual and group
bearers of this spirituality encourage each other to forge alliances with those in
other walks of life who have the same spiritual affinities.13
Connolly’s account here meets one of the challenges to the study of neoliberalism head-on.
Where some scholars have argued that the designation of neoliberalism has come to refer to too
many positions, arrangements, and practices that are in some ways contradicting, for Connolly
these contradictions are part of this process.14 As we shall see, Calvin Beisner serves as an
excellent example of this dynamic. His insistence that centralized state planning to address
environmental concerns threatens the poor, and subsequent argument that a “truly free” market is
required instead, allows him to embrace such policies as tax exemptions for the rich and state
deregulation, while opposing social welfare programs, abortion, and federal funding for AIDS
research.15
On Connolly’s view, one of the key mechanisms that drives this resonance machine on
the evangelical side is the role that community leadership plays in times of economic crisis or
uncertainty. He argues that the calling to evangelize often reverberates with the capitalist affect
of entitlement—a feature of the transfiguration of interest into greed. Times of economic
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hardship or crisis create the political conditions for community leaders to rally their
congregations around economic policy as a form of group preservation against persecution.
Connolly reads this affect as drawing on not a belief in the market itself, but in the economic
ideals espoused by the market and its promises, combined with the conviction by many
evangelists that entrepreneurial activity is the one worldly activity endowed with divine
providence.16 The ideal of individualism in particular plays an active role in the American
context.
The affective resonances between Christianity and capitalism congeal most vividly on the
right, in Connolly’s view, through a particular reading of Revelation and the second coming that
reverberates with anger, will to revenge, and the externalization of anxiety over one’s faith. He
predicts that the pressures to engage in this externalization, defining one’s adversaries as
“wanton sinners,” will escalate as more believers discover that Christianity is very much a
minority religion on the globe. “Self-doubt and uncertainty are transfigured into an implacable
drive to revenge against those who deny that Christ is the son of God,” while at the same time,
insistence on the divine providence of entrepreneurial activity allows proponents to disparage
welfare programs and “collective efforts to curtail global warming.”17 Importantly for Connolly,
these affects are not necessarily determinative, rather, they explain the affinities between these
positions by examining the intensity of the spiritualities that compose it. When these affects are
captured in hegemonic evangelical narratives, and taken up with intensity, we can expect the
resonances with cowboy capitalism to endure.
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Epistemologies of ignorance, then, are crucial for understanding how this resonance
machine produces a skeptical orientation toward the anthropogenic climate change thesis
(produces ignorance about climate change). They help us to see how these resonances between
Christianity and capitalism in turn resonate with knowledge about nature, and they help us to
think through resonances with more hegemonic forms of ignorance insulated by epistemologies
of mastery and possession—namely, white ignorance of racial oppression, settler ignorance of
indigenous history and knowledge, and male ignorance of female bodies, experiences, and
knowledges. In this sense, epistemologies of ignorance enrich Connolly’s resonance machine by
examining how these resonances get taken up by individuals through their group membership
and are in turn translated into policy orientations.
I argue that the relationship between Connolly’s machine and epistemologies of
ignorance should further be understood in relation to two concepts that arise from Lorraine
Code’s work: “epistemology of mastery” and “social imaginary.”18 To read the resonance
machine as its own social imaginary, that both draws on and resists the epistemology of mastery,
lays the groundwork for exploring epistemologies of ignorance in this context. In her book
Ecological Thinking: the Politics of Epistemic Location, philosopher Lorraine Code argues for
an ecological approach to knowledge that resists and contests the “dominant epistemologies of
post-Industrial Revolution affluent societies [that] are (often tacitly) complicit in perpetuating the
rhetoric of mastery and possession: knowledge acquired for manipulation, prediction, and control
over nature and human nature; knowledge as a prized commodity legitimating its possessors’
authoritative occupancy (and sometime abuse) of positions of power and recasting ‘the natural
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world’ as a resource for human gratification.”19 Epistemologies of mastery and possession
authorized slavery, colonialism, the seizure of indigenous lands, modern sovereignty, and
environmental degradation and extraction, all of which have been central to the positivism that
establishes an objective and detached science as the ultimate authority in knowledge production
and evaluation. As I will show, though the evangelical rebuttal against environmentalism wields
the epistemology of mastery somewhat differently than white supremacy (although we should
also ask if and where this particular evangelical formation and white supremacy are entangled
with one another)—it does rely on its progressive economic narrative, while simultaneously
troubling its hierarchy of knowledge regimes. In this sense, it might appear to engage in
epistemic practices that are particular and that resist the universalizing pull of enlightenment
humanism. And yet, in its attempt to seek out evangelical knowledge about human nature and
nature generally, it reifies a vision of the human that perfectly resonates with the subject required
and produced by neoliberal economics. Neoliberalism, in this sense, does not only combine with
a certain interpretation of the evangelist doctrine to constitute this political constellation, as
Connolly argues—it also lends evangelicalism a potency in its specific conflicts with scientific
knowledge and practice.
What does it mean to locate a social imaginary of American evangelical climate
denialism? Like Code, I am interested in a social imaginary that sustains “hegemonic practices of
mastery” (e.g. extraction and degradation), with a web of “assumptions and tacit agreements”
belonging to everyone and no one, about how best to know nature, human nature, and their
interrelations.20 For Code, this social imaginary is in part productive of a relationship to science
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and scientific knowledge, but it also produces meaning, images, metaphors, operative idea(l)s
and interlocking “explanations-expectations” that are constitutive of patterns of legitimacy,
credibility, and their opposites. These “often-implicit” systems and patterns are the mechanisms
with which people and groups, in particular times and places, “enact their knowledge and
subjectivities and craft their self-understandings.”21 As importantly, a social imaginary “is never
seamless or static in a nontotalitarian society: it is always in motion, whether in maintaining
itself or in critical interrogation within and around it.”22 A social imaginary is a hegemonic
narrative that assembles and organizes images, metaphors, and meanings for the collective that is
established by and through that narrative, even if these cues are not collectively deliberated on,
or even necessarily universally shared. The social imaginary that infuses and sustains the ethos
and habitus of climate change denial in evangelicalism, then, is best thought of not as an
articulated political position held by each individual member of the group, but as a feature of the
resonance machine. In this case, both the cognitive and affective dimensions of this social
landscape are crucial for understanding Calvin Beisner’s project as more dynamic than simply a
campaign of misinformation.
Consider the theorizations of ignorance contained in the volume Race and
Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana. Ignorance is
conceived variously as a historical feature of white supremacy, produced socially through
processes of perception, conception, memory, testimony, and motivational group interest;23 as a
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substantive epistemic practice that is structural and linked to social privilege and oppression;24 as
“wielded strategically by groups living under oppression as a way of gaining information,
sabotaging work, avoiding or delaying harm, and preserving a sense of self;”25 as something that
is managed and preserved by sometimes “grotesquely prodigious effort;”26 and as an ecology
sustained by and sustaining the sexual, racial, expropriation, slavery, and colonial contracts.27 It
is sometimes referred to as a strategy of anti-elitism, as willful, or as conscious and selfcongratulatory.
How can we situate evangelical ignorance about climate change alongside these
accounts? Is it simply a strategic political position that wields the armor of anti-intellectualism
for the pursuit of goals that serve the individual interests of powerful evangelical elite?28 Is it
rooted in and sustained by the colonial contracts that authorize epistemologies of mastery and
possession? Is it a strategic way to preserve an evangelical sense of self? Part of the difficulty
that lies in this situating is that evangelical communities are not a cohesive, coherent
demographic group. But then again, neither are women, black folks, and indigenous peoples. In
this sense, evangelical ignorance of climate change is at once, and partially, all of these things.
The reading I offer here is of one particular right-wing evangelical social imaginary—that in
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addition to resonating with a capitalist ethos, resonates with ignorance of both the oppressed and
the oppressor—one in which climate scientists and their advocates at the policy level pose a
threat to evangelicalism itself. The stakes then are not about climate change or the environment
at all, but about how much more ground evangelicalism can afford to cede to a secular
government that has already taken over so much of the social domain of the church, where
institutionalized social services have encroached on the church provision of both charity and
community.29 In this sense, climate change denial powerfully taps into a long history of the
Christian right’s struggle against secularization and fraught relationship with the American state.

Epistemologies of Ignorance
The philosophical study of ignorance (or agnotology) is an important recent development in the
study of knowledge that has its origins in the social justice oriented projects of feminism and
critical race theory. The questions that animate this area of study include: How should we
understand ignorance? How is it produced and maintained? What role does ignorance play in our
lives generally, and particularly in the establishment and maintenance of social hierarchies? The
landscape of central themes, insights, and tensions among the varying answers to these questions
serve as my groundwork for reading Beisner’s work as an epistemic project. Of particular
importance are the ways in which ignorance has been typologized, and the analyses of the role
that different forms of ignorance play in structuring relations between and among groups. I read
Beisner as relying on the understanding of ignorance as native state, in order to cultivate
ignorance of the other two types.
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Robert Proctor, in the introduction to the collection Agnotology: The Making &
Unmaking of Ignorance, suggests that part of the project of exploring ignorance as “more than
the not yet known” involves making distinctions between types of ignorance.30 He proposes three
possible distinctions as a starting point—ignorance as “native state”; ignorance as “lost realm”;
and ignorance as a “strategic ploy.” This typology distinguishes between both sources of
ignorance—where does it come from—as well as between ways about which ignorance has been
discussed and queried. I argue that though Calvin Beisner draws on an understanding of
ignorance as native state in order to justify a position that is often characterized as a strategic
ploy (climate change denial), his own realignment of Christianity with real science, and of
environmentalism with religion, plays on the image of ignorance as lost realm and is where much
of the complex epistemic work is being done.
For Proctor, explanations of ignorance as native state are largely attributable to scientists,
to scientific approaches to knowledge, and to modernity. Ignorance here is the “not yet known,”
and that “not yet” is the driver of knowledge production and, to a certain extent, of history.
Ignorance is a resource—a flag to denote questions for study—and at the same time a hurdle
which must be overcome. Ignorance is absence and void, knowledge the thing that fills it.
Modernity breathes enlightenment language into this characterization. “Light floods the
darkness, keys are found to unlock locks, ignorance is washed away, teaching uplifts out of
ignorance, which is thereby destroyed or chased, and so forth.”31 If ignorance is the “not yet”
then so are the ignorant—those without knowledge are conceptualized as children or as
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primitive, and the progressive march of history aims at remediating this state, though only up to a
point. One of the features of ignorance in this modern sense is that it is regenerative. As Proctor
notes, for every question answered, two more arise. The whole enterprise of science (and thus of
progress) is sustained by the ineradicable existence of ignorance conceived as either lack of
knowledge, or the not yet known.32 As we shall see, the ignorance-as-lack view of science is one
that, perhaps paradoxically, infuses all of Beisner’s engagements with environmentalists and
climate science.
These metaphors, and the corollary political and scientific projects to remediate
ignorance as native state, are the stuff of Code’s epistemology of mastery. This is the view of
ignorance that authorized colonialism as a project of progress (savages haven’t yet embraced
scientific knowledge as the harbinger of civilization), that continues to authorize extraction as a
project of progress (nature is a passive object of knowledge and available to be mined as a
resource), and that breathes life into doctrines of individualism (ignorance as a yardstick against
which to evaluate individual lives and possibilities). Yet while this view is problematized within
scholarship on ignorance, it also provides a useful heuristic for thinking about the distribution of
epistemic resources. Insofar as there are forms of ignorance that are correctable, the kinds of
questions we ought to pose pertain to who has been denied access to what epistemic resources,
and why. Put differently, if we are conceptualizing ignorance as a lack of knowledge, we should
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ask who does not know what and why, and these answers in turn provide cues for a more robust,
structural account of the mechanisms of ignorance.
The questions that arise from conceiving of ignorance as native state anticipate the view
of ignorance as “lost realm.” Similar to the regenerative feature of ignorance as “lost realm,”
ignorance can also be a feature of “selectivity,”33 both scientific and otherwise. Which questions
get addressed at any given historical moment, or in any given space, inevitably leave some things
unasked or unaccounted for. Selection is important on different levels – it plays out visually,
affecting what is seen as an important question to ask, or as an interesting phenomenon to
explain; and it also plays out in the interpretive context, both in the framing of the question, and
in the selection of method for approaching it. The unasked questions are part of this “lost realm”
of knowledge, but there are also kinds of knowledge that have actually been lost over time.
Proctor (along with others34) argues that colonialism plays a hugely important role in the
historical production of ignorance. The preference for Enlightenment-based scientific approaches
to knowledge led colonizers to dismiss indigenous forms of knowledge, about agriculture or
women’s health and reproduction for example, as folk-knowledge and these knowledges in turn
all but disappear from the annals of history. Beisner’s sharp criticism of post-normal science
should be understood as cultivating precisely this form of ignorance—rendering certain
questions and techniques for answering them outside the purview of scientific (or theological)
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knowledge production, and therefore ineligible for public deliberation as such.35 The criteria for
good scientific practice to which he latches (infused with the enlightenment imagery) allow him
to eject much of mainstream climate science into this lost realm as either not knowledge, but
something else (sometimes politics, sometimes sacrilegious fanaticism), or as simply notknowable at all.
Ignorance as strategic ploy/active construct is perhaps most familiar in the case of debate
about climate change—there is ample debate about the extent to which the manipulation,
interpretation, and presentation of scientific data all impact public engagement with scientific
knowledge.36 But Proctor notes that this is not just a matter of having a structure of knowledge
on one hand, and individuals’ interactions with it in the other. It is often rather a matter of a
context obscuring access to certain “historical contingencies.”37 Proctor devotes significant time
to some very specific examples of the kind of manufactured ignorance that we might normally
associate with climate change denial—the tobacco industry, and military classification being the
two most common. In the case of the tobacco industry, the campaign to cast doubt on the
scientific consensus that smoking cigarettes is harmful to people’s health is well documented.
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Tobacco companies hired their own scientists to engage in a two-prong approach to
manufacturing ignorance about cigarettes’ effects. The first was to publish work that was critical
of the methods and conclusions of the studies that linked cigarette smoke to specific health
problems, and the second was to produce their own studies that demonstrated significantly less
cause for alarm, if they demonstrated anything at all. This form of ignorance is generally thought
of as having politically motivated intentionality behind it, but might also be thought of as
encompassing other kinds of latent or unarticulated willful ignorance.
Following Proctor’s typology, various questions arise regarding how these types of
ignorance work together or inform one another. The examples that motivate the study of race and
ignorance, for example, reverberate differently within each of the three conceptualizations that
Proctor offers. To explain white racism and ignorance about white supremacy as a feature of
individual “knowledge not yet acquired” and to interrogate in what that knowledge consists,
recourse to each of the other two concepts is necessary. To ask what is it that is “not yet known”
in the case of individually held racist beliefs is to miss the vested interest white people as a group
have in continuing to “not know” about their own privilege—or in other words, in remaining
ignorant.38 To think about the persistence of white supremacy as a feature of an ignorance regime
requires conceptualizing it as having a geography and a vibrancy of its own. I argue that climate
change denial in the context of conservative, white evangelicalism similarly reverberates in all
three registers. To pose the question as one of individual knowers’ lack of knowledge misses the
extent to which vested group interests have been bound up with/produced through the capitalistevangelical resonance machine.
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Using this landscape of ignorance to think through the backlash against evangelical
environmentalism, I argue, allows us to read Calvin Beisner in at least three different ways. First,
it allows us to analyze the ways in which he invokes the requirements for good scientific
knowledge—and with that the enlightenment image of ignorance as the not yet known—in order
to encourage a focus on a different set of problems and questions. Second, it allows us to see the
ways in which he folds neoliberal market language into his biblical exegesis—which I take to be
a core strategy for his demarcation of knowledge from “something else” and of the knowable
against what cannot be known. And finally, it allows us to examine his invocation of belonging,
in what that belonging consists, and that which threatens it. Working together, these three aspects
of his work articulate a social imaginary where the criteria for good science according to an
orthodox scientific epistemology foreground a cowboy capitalist evangelical refusal of or
response to an environmentalism that threatens the existence of evangelicals as a community of
knowers.

Calvin Beisner’s Crusade Against Evangelical Environmentalism
In 2010, Calvin Beisner participated in a panel presentation at the International Climate Science
Coalition Fourth International Conference on Climate Change. His talk was entitled, “Climate
Policy: Theological, Scientific, and Economic Considerations,” and it opened with the following
polemic: “The world is in the grip of an idea: that burning fossil fuels to provide cheap, abundant
energy is causing global warming that will be so dangerous that we must stop it by reducing our
use of fossil fuels, no matter the cost.”39 Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the
conference was organized by the Heartland Institute and funded in part by donations from
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ExxonMobil, Koch family foundations, and Scaife family foundations,40 the setup for this talk
(and for the conference as a whole) is emblematic of the epistemic terrain at stake in Beisner’s
nearly 30-year promotion of evangelical stewardship of the earth as climate change
denial/skepticism.41 Revealingly, the entire project operates under the guise of good scientific
practice, while at the same time reconfiguring the terms of discourse into those of the resonance
machine.

Evidence and Rational Debate
In his 1997 book Where Garden Meets Wilderness, perhaps his most thorough engagement with
the early evangelical environmentalists, Beisner articulates two prongs of the epistemic quandary
facing evangelicals on questions of the environment and stewardship. The book is an attempt to
think through on one hand, what we know, and on the other, what we should do given what we
know (the relevant “we” of course being evangelicals). The pursuit of knowledge is
foregrounded as the central concern. The various chapters are littered with subheadings such as:
“How Should We Perceive Our World?;”42 “Does the Bible Really Say This?;”43 and “Five More
Fallacious Types of Argument.”44 The bibliography boasts hundreds of sources, spanning
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scientific works, economic treatises, news media, biblical texts, and materials produced by
environmental organizations.
But the inverse of those concerns also haunts the book—where Beisner claims to be
getting to the bottom of what we really know, it turns out that the most important thing all the
way down is what we do not know. So though the book purports to be clearing the ground for
knowledge about the environment, and a corresponding set of prescriptions for how evangelicals
should then respond to this knowledge, it is in fact better thought of as a book collecting all the
claims we should doubt are true and as a rulebook on what actions not to take. Beisner performs
“good science” in order to answer two questions: 1) what does the bible tell us about
environmental stewardship (and the sometimes explicit/sometimes implicit sub-question what
does the bible tell us about climate change?)?; and 2) what other evidence can we look to where
the bible does not provide answers? He subsequently takes a two-prong approach to defining his
own take on evangelical environmentalism. It first allows him to engage in a friendly sort-of peer
review of the different biblical justifications for action to combat climate change, while laying
the groundwork for the claim that the bible cannot give us all we need given the current political
(especially political for evangelicals) stakes. And it then allows him to clear up some common
“misconceptions” that environmentalists have regarding the scientific evidence. Though Beisner
never says that climate change is not real, it is hard to grasp anything that can be concretely
known by the reader in the end. The pervasive treatment of the not yet known, or the not possible
to know, makes the whole book read like an exercise in unlearning, unmaking, and unraveling.
He deploys images of ignorance as lack of knowledge, while subtly (or not so subtly) cultivating
ignorance borne of both selectivity and strategic construct.
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At the close of chapter six, entitled “Observations of the Mind of the Evangelical
Environmental Movement,” Beisner makes the following claim:
The quality of the environmental debate among evangelicals can improve if all
sides will commit to logic and evidence rather than misrepresentations, moral
condemnations, ad hominem arguments, intimidation, appeals to majorities, and
unbalanced emphasis of either the negative or the positive aspects of phenomena.
It is my hope that this book—regardless whether it persuades any of my brothers
and sisters in the evangelical environmental movement of any of the positions I
take on the theological, ethical, biblical, and empirical issues discussed—will at
least help to elevate the debate.45
This is a rhetorical approach Beisner deploys throughout the book: detail the “controversy;”
remind the reader of the importance of clarity, logic, and evidence; provide, or flag, the “missing
evidence”; and finally offer a different perspective on the controversy for the stated purpose of
moving knowledge forward, which in effect requires slowing down and taking caution in action
(or not acting at all). In the fifth chapter, for example, he engages in this mode of “scientific”
argumentation (a purportedly unbiased review of the available evidence) in order to explore what
he calls “the problem of environmental misinformation.”46
This chapter is particularly interesting for the way that it characterizes the cause and
source of what Beisner highlights as “misinformation.” It is not just that environmentalists have
misinterpreted the evidence, but they have also intentionally misrepresented it in order to
frighten people into a “crisis mentality.” He details the goal of the chapter as to “examine some
examples of empirical errors and scare tactics both to offer readers another view of the alleged
problems and to suggest points at which evangelical environmentalists need to be more careful
about empirical claims.”47 The empirical claims and the interpretation of the consequences of
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these empirical claims are tied tightly together in Beisner’s analysis. It is not simply empirically
incorrect that Americans have consumed more of the world’s resources since 1945 than all
previous generations together—he also argues that environmentalists draw moral conclusions
from the misinterpretation of this data that are logically irrelevant to it.48
How should we make sense of Beisner’s continued insistence on the importance of both
the unknown and of lack of bias for the proper evaluation of evidence? This is the aspect of his
work that draws most heavily on the enlightenment images and metaphors for good scientific
practice and knowledge. An orthodox scientific epistemology is concerned with discerning the
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge-making, producing universally valid
principles, replicability and experimentation, reliable observations, knowers as value-free, and
theory as (politically and socially) neutral.49 These images infuse Beisner’s engagement with
environmentalists at the same time that he insists on the importance of cultivating a specifically
evangelical sensibility for environmental questions and concerns. He obsesses over how to
properly define the terms of measurement,50 over how to generate “truly representative”
examples,51 and over predictions that fail to come true or to be truly explanatory.52 On the case
of how to properly measure deforestation he writes:
This is no small margin of error. It is not the sort of thing that, in scientific work,
understandably arises from slight variations in method or measurement. Huge
variations like this more often stem from lack of reliable empirical study as the
basis for any numbers at all. These discrepancies, in other words, are not just
insignificant oddities. They are symptomatic of a larger problem that afflicts a
great deal of environmental science and propaganda: a scarcity of long-term,
observational field data. All too often the missing field data are replaced by
48
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simple guesses that later get repeated as estimates, only to be repeated ever after
as proven facts.53
As Beisner would have the reader believe, environmentalists fail on the front of good scientific
practice in two ways—they fail to collect appropriate data needed to meet the necessary and
sufficient conditions for making knowledge claims, and they fail to interpret the data that they do
have reliably, neutrally, and value-free.
Note that my own claim here is not that Beisner is practicing good science, but rather that
he borrows the concepts and norms of a classic scientific epistemology in order to encourage
doubt about a set of scientifically based political movements and programs for action. This is
important because it calls into question the idea of the authority of consensus at the same time as
it reifies a neutral science as the only reliable one. Never mind that Beisner’s own engagement is
anything but neutral. In fact, another crucial feature of Beisner’s evaluation of evidence, which
highlights the potency of neoliberalism in the construction of this knowledge/ignorance regime,
is its latent insistence that individualism serves as an important prerequisite for unbiased
evaluation. Much of the force of Beisner’s argumentation relies on his positioning of himself as a
free-thinker. The importance of freedom of thought is folded intricately into his biblical readings
of labor and nature, as well as into his engagements with environmental science. In this sense, he
knits the scientific and the biblical tightly together under the rubric of neoliberalism. The realm
of thought and knowledge is like a market – we can only flourish in it when we are committed to
freedom from regulation(/bias). This argument works only in the context of the resonance
machine. Only within the machine can Beisner be at once an evangelist, a cowboy capitalist, and
a scientist.
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Biblical Exegesis and the Neoliberal Imaginary
Beisner’s efforts to dismantle the biblical justification for a stewardship of the earth that
responds to anthropogenic climate change revolve around three central interpretive debates over
the doctrine of dominion, the curse, and imago dei. The conclusions he draws about these
interpretive concerns are less important than the preponderance of neoliberal imagery and
language (and the repeated citations of economists Friedrich Hayek and Julian Simon) that
sustains both his readings of others’ interpretations, as well as his own.54 Take his discussion of
the doctrine of dominion as an example.
Beisner argues that the Biblical teaching from Genesis 1:28 that God has given man
dominion over the earth is the central Biblical truth that is misconstrued by both secular
environmentalists and by evangelical ones, and which fails to generate knowledge useful for the
evangelical community.55 He criticizes secular, feminist, deep ecology, and new age approaches
to environmentalism for the blame they place on Christianity, and on the Bible itself, for the link
between this teaching and historical environmental degradation. But he argues that evangelical
environmentalists have failed to adequately counter this charge in their explications of the
centrality of stewardship in biblical text. On his view, they have further confused the doctrine of
dominion, rather than clarified it, by virtue of their failure to read dominion and stewardship as
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“balancing truths.” This failure plays out in two specific ways. First, that evangelical
environmentalists rely on a misreading of genesis 1:28 in conjunction with genesis 2:15 – where
in 1:28 Adam “subdues” and “rules” the earth on behalf of God, and in 2:15 Adam is meant to
“till” and “keep” the garden of Eden. Beisner claims that environmentalists incorrectly read “till”
and “keep” as a specification of “subdue” and “rule,” and in doing so, they miss an important
distinction between earth and Garden. Second, supposing that the command to till and keep does
define or refine the command to subdue and rule, some environmentalists mistakenly emphasize
the meaning of the word that translates into till or cultivate (abad) - into “serve.”56 Beisner
argues that to emphasize servitude as the appropriate translation of till is to miss again the
contrast between earth and garden in Genesis’s geography, and that while “indeed all of man’s
tilling of the earth should be service to God, it is inaccurate to say that it is service to the Earth
itself.” This mistaken interpretation—that keep and till, are a refinement of the mandate to
subdue and rule—on Beisner’s view in fact lends itself to sacrilegious practices such as new age
Gaia worship.
Beisner instead translates the word for till differently, arguing that “when it is followed
by the accusative of things, [it should be translated] as to labor, work, or do work, e.g. to till the
ground, a vineyard, or garden.”57 He turns then to Richard Young’s exegesis of this translation
as the one that has paid most attention to the balancing truths in Genesis:
The word translated “work” or “till” is the common Hebrew word for “serve.”
The most common meanings are 1) to work, used especially when there is no
object 2) to cultivate, when the object is ground, vineyard, or the like 3) to work
for someone either as a servant or a slave and 4) to serve or worship a deity…
Normally when ground is the object, the word means to till or cultivate, implying
cultivation for one’s own sustenance. The context of Genesis 2:5 however
suggests a different focus. God’s concern is not with people managing the garden
56
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for their own sustenance, for they had not been created yet, but with the need for a
manager to help keep order and harmony in creation. The service is rendered to
God, not ourselves.58
So Beisner takes this, in conjunction with the difference he develops elsewhere between Garden
and earth – namely that the earth was good, but that the garden of Eden was specially good – to
mean that dominion over earth is a mandate that involves transforming the rest of the earth, bit
by bit, in the image of Eden’s glory. He claims, “the dominion mandate, properly understood,
gives man legitimate authority to subdue and rule the earth, progressively conforming it to his
needs and the glory of God.”59 He goes on to say “that people do and will rule the earth is
unavoidable. How they rule is the crucial question.”60 The crucial task for Evangelical
environmentalists, on this reading, is to insist as far as possible that humans rule consistently
with the commandments of God’ law, rather than with secular humanist notions of right and
wrong, or with the values of Eastern religion.
Note the language of capitalism in the above discussion. Dominion should be understood
according to a rubric of labor and management, progressively transforming the earth according to
the divine example of the garden. For Beisner, dominion over the earth should not be understood
as mastery unbounded, but rather as mastery according to the requirements for the cultivation of
global wealth accumulation (Beisner often talks about global poverty amelioration, but it is not
clear that he is committed to any kind of redistribution of wealth except that “naturally” occurs in
“free” market contexts).61 In this sense, Beisner transforms the epistemology of mastery – the

58

Ibid, 15.
Ibid, 16.
60
Ibid, 16.
61
In much of his recent commentary on climate change he makes comments such as: “Sad to
say, despite Pope Francis’s best intentions, the policies he recommends to mitigate global
warming would make it far more difficult to overcome poverty. And, ironically, by prolonging
and even spreading poverty, those policies would put more of the natural environment at risk,”
59

70

language of market fundamentalism allows him to articulate a specific understanding of the
proper evangelical relationship to (cultivation of) non-human nature, while rendering the
evangelical subject as the neutral, universal, and rational individual of enlightenment thinking.
He joins reason to revelation. What evangelicals risk in their encounters with environmentalism
then, is relinquishing dominion of the earth as granted by god. In a later discussion on
biodiversity, he explicitly defines the principles of biblical stewardship as “a free market within
the moral restraints of God’s law.”62
Beisner’s attempts to explicate how Evangelicals ought to approach the doctrine of
dominion is instructive in the types of evidence it legitimates for knowledge in the realm of
decision-making. He argues that “one problem of the doctrine is that it simply doesn’t give
direct, pat answers to most of the questions raised in environmental discussions.”63 He then goes
on to ask, “should we drill for oil? Here? How? Should we mine coal? There? By boring (which
is much more dangerous to the miners), or strip-mining (which can leave ugly scars on the land,
although scars can be restored to beauty)? Should we log old-growth forests? Where? How
much, if any, should we preserve?”64 He argues that evangelicals should not locate answers to
these questions in scripture, because to even pose the questions in this way confuses the primary
Biblical truth of human survival as the top priority. What we actually need he argues is
“generations of thought and experience” (or, evidence) – but still filtered through the mandate of
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dominion, and always prioritizing human life.65 He argues, for example, that there is a difference
between giving up one’s life to save another human being and giving it up to save a hill, or
forest, or whale (but also by the way, he claims, there is no reason why sensible hunting of
whales need threaten their whole species). It is very telling that the only examples of the kinds of
“environmental” questions that we need non-biblical evidence to solve are ones that pit
economic development and industry against concern for non-human nature on its own terms.
Neoliberalism as a political (and ethical) commitment to free markets infuses these
discussions in two ways. Through the language of stewardship as managerialism and dominion,
it grounds the evangelical knower in her biblical commitments, and it dictates the terms of the
environmental discussion. In this sense, it is the capitalist part of the resonance machine that gets
pitted against the (ideological) environmentalist—not the Christian against the scientist.

Belonging to an Evangelical Community
Beisner’s appendix discussion on biodiversity in Where Garden Meets Wilderness is a
striking example of the way his performance of good scientific practice and his realignment of
revelation with reason work together to draw a boundary around the community that is at stake,
while simultaneously obscuring that boundary as a demonstration of a broader ethical
commitment. In this chapter, he engages deep ecologists, ecofeminists, and animal rights
activists on both the scientific grounds for, as well as the ethical commitments to, advocacy for
biodiversity. He details three primary qualifications of the view that maintaining biodiversity is a
good end in general: 1) that there are some biologically diverse entities, such as viruses, that he
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takes the extinction of which to be an acceptable reduction of biodiversity, which in turn is a
defensible view only if one concedes that some hierarchizing of biological entities is necessary
and acceptable;66 2) that there are “trade-offs” in maintaining biodiversity;67 and 3) it is
impossible to avoid “opportunity costs” in species preservation.68 The last two qualifications
center neoliberal commitments in the analysis blatantly in the economic language, but the way
that the first qualification unfolds throughout the discussion is quite revealing. It turns out that
though the Christian assumptions at play in developing “qualitative distinctions between life
forms” place all humans at the top of the rung of ethical consideration, what is really at stake is
the worldview that authorizes this particular hierarchy, as well as the decisions and calculations
that need to be made for the consequent economic trade-offs and opportunity costs.69
Beisner’s critiques of deep ecology, ecofeminism, and animal rights views subsequently
revolve around what he takes to be mistaken alternate sets of assumptions that authorize different
ethical hierarchies, combined again with a “critical” engagement of the scientific evidence. He
claims, “the purpose of pointing to the lack of sound evidence regarding the rate of species
extinction is not to belittle or ignore what might be a significant problem but to remind ourselves
that sound policy must be based on sound information.”70 Note also his characterization of the
feminist critique of science: “contemporary feminism rejects science outright—or redefines it—
because science operates in a manner not sufficiently sensitive to ‘feminine thought patterns’
because it is a fundamentally ‘masculine’ discipline.”71 And further his critique of Peter Singer
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and other thinkers on animal rights: “this perspective trivializes racism by putting speciesism on
the same level with it. If I were Black, I’d be worried about anyone who said speciesism was as
bad as racism.”72 But Beisner is not black, and is he not also engaged in a version of redefining
science or critiquing scientific practice in accordance with his own assumptions and worldview?
What we see at work in this chapter is a recourse to the economistic, the calculative, and the
instrumental for the setup of an ethical struggle that sets the stage for skepticism of a certain
scientific conclusion. To be an evangelical (with a commitment to the worldview that authorizes
a particular characterization of the important qualitative distinctions among life forms), and to
act in an evangelical way (make the proper trade-offs and calculate the relevant opportunity
costs) means to engage this particular body of knowledge with hesitation and doubt, lest risk the
survival of the very worldview to begin with.
Post-normal science poses a similar threat to the group in much of Beisner’s more recent
writing and lecturing. Beisner argues that environmentalism ought to be thought of as a “religion
in its own right,” competing with Christianity (in the United States as well as globally) as a well
from which to draw ethical, social, and political considerations.73 For him, the criteria for good
scientific practice are not bound up in the secular humanism of the enlightenment, but are rather
outgrowths of Christian faith and doctrine.74 As such, part of the existential threat that the
environmentalist worldview poses for the Christian worldview actually involves what he
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characterizes as its refusal of science—its “flight from reason to mysticism.”75 Consider the
following remarks:
In other words, ‘post-normal science,’ shorn of the commitments of ‘normal
science’ to transparency, disinterestedness, falsifiability, and skepticism, is the
guise under which climate change and any other issue can become the vehicle for
promoting predetermined social and political goals. The warfare between postnormal science and real science is important not just in the debate over ‘climate
change,’ but in all kinds of issues in which science interfaces with policy. Like the
pseudo-Christian cults that borrow vocabulary from Christianity but redefine all
the terms, post-normal science is simply the application of rhetoric borrowed from
the sciences to policy debates, cloaking one particular policy preference with the
authority of ‘science,’ and successful at doing so only to the extent that policy
makers and the public are ignorant of the fact that post-normal science isn’t
science at all.76
Beisner here—in aligning post-normal science with pseudo-Christian cults (post-normal science
distorts the criteria of science in the same way that pseudo-Christian cults distort Christian
concepts), after having argued that transparency, disinterestedness, falsifiability, and skepticism
should be understood as products of Christianity rather than secular humanism—in a sense
redraws the terms of the debate at the same time as he shifts the stakes. If Christianity and the
criteria for good scientific practice become analogous by virtue of the analogousness of that
which distorts each, then it is no longer scientific knowledge that poses a threat to the
evangelical community—as the evolution debates have often been cast—but rather, science
authorizes and insulates the evangelical worldview from the charge of having cloaked its policy
preferences with the authority of science.77 In this rendering, Christian values become the
neutral, unbiased values and anything that parades as Christian (recognizable by any non-
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capitalist leanings), without the corresponding enactment of Beisner’s interpretation of
stewardship, risks toppling the Christian worldview altogether.78

Conclusion
I have argued in this chapter that it is important to understand white evangelical climate change
denial as a dynamic feature of the “resonance machine” between capitalism and Christianity in
the United States, and that epistemologies of ignorance are vital to trace these processes. In
particular, examining the epistemic practices of this group’s elite illustrates that the success of
the project lies in the extent to which the grounds for knowledge are also grounds for
membership in the group, at the same time as they posit the group’s existence as precarious.
Beisner is an exemplar of this epistemic maneuvering. His bundling of scientific practice and
economic progress together under the rubric of divine mandate paradoxically (and at the same
time, likely intentionally) leaves little room for participation in his so revered marketplace of
exchange.
A recent study published in the Journal of Geoscience Education found that conservative
evangelical undergraduate students reported high levels of shift in perspective on issues related
to climate change after hearing a lecture from an evangelical climate scientist, where the
scientific research was presented through an evangelical lens, accompanied by a discussion of
how science and faith differ, and included a discussion of theology-based ethics.79 The
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researchers came to the conclusion that the relevant factor at play was a clear delineation
between fact and belief, but I argue that a return to Connolly’s resonance-machine gives us a
different read on this outcome. We might instead call attention to the affective dimension at play
in this dynamic. The relevant distinction then is not that students have achieved sudden clarity
about the technical distinctions between facts and beliefs, but rather that to tell a story about a
certain set of facts from the perspective of membership in a group allows for the facts to gain
traction in a way they might not otherwise have had.
Beisner’s solicitation of the neutrality of scientific practice for the pursuit of conservative
evangelical ends lays important groundwork for questions about both the possibility and the
value of neutrality at all, which will be taken up more explicitly in the following chapter.
Epistemologies of ignorance as a critical project invite a consideration of the role that
membership in a group plays in knowledge production generally, in setting the terms of
engagement with knowledge, and in drawing the boundaries around the consequences of acting
in response to or in light of knowledge. In particular, a broader and more dynamic understanding
of what ignorance is and how it works is important for revealing how the narrow way that a
classic, Enlightenment conception of ignorance as lack lets us off the hook for taking seriously
the structural forces that shape our engagements with knowledge—scientific or otherwise.
Though Beisner is on one hand guilty of what Connolly has elsewhere called the “Big Lie
scenario,” “in which you accuse the other of what you are doing and then repeat the charge
endlessly,”80 he is able to do so under the auspices of an explicit commitment to transparency,
falsifiability, and neutrality. As I argue in the next chapter, critical engagements with other
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scientific concepts – engagements that share many intellectual affinities with epistemologies of
ignorance – should be understood as responding to precisely this counter-intuitive mode by
which neutrality, rather than serving as a measurement for the refinement of scientific practice,
more often serves to draw a boundary around who is recognized as a relevant or legitimate
participant in a given debate.
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Chapter 3
Anti-Science, Objectivity, and Reason
In a 1996 essay titled “Science and Anti-Science: Objectivity and its Real Enemies,”
Elisabeth A. Lloyd debunks a series of myths about the perceived anti-scientific nature of
feminist engagements with science.1 According to her interlocutors, the “anti-science” charge is
justified by the following assessments: feminists forsake evidence and truth in favor of
ideological standards; feminists reject objectivity in favor of relativism; feminists either do not
understand, or are hostile to the ideals of scientific inquiry; and feminists (incorrectly) renounce
the idea of rationality itself. For Lloyd, these charges are especially puzzling in light of the fact
that the supposed culprits of these crimes are thinkers who have explicitly and systematically
rejected all of these positions. Indeed, the feminists frequently invoked in these condemnations
of feminist science are “among the most overtly pro-science feminists.” Lloyd’s goal in her piece
is “to identify and examine central assumptions and loci of concern that play important roles in
attempts to discredit feminist contributions to the sciences and to science studies.”2 I suggest in
this chapter that her work in this essay can serve as a point of departure for thinking about other
charges of “anti-science,” and the central assumptions and loci of concern that constitute
recourse to the authority of a rational, detached, objective Science—namely, in the case of
climate change debate.
In public discussion over the veracity of the anthropogenic climate change thesis in the
United States, the anti-science charge is, and has been, leveled at and from all directions. One

1

Elisabeth A. Lloyd, “Science and Anti-Science: Objectivity and its Real Enemies.” In
Feminism, Science and the Philosophy of Science, edited by Lynn Hankinson Nelson and Jack
Nelson, 217-259 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996).
2
Ibid, 217.
79

frequently encounters such denouncements as “scientific fascism,”3 “a disgrace to the
profession,”4 “eco-tyranny,”5 “hoodwinking,”6 “obscured the truth,”7 “betrayal of science and
reason,”8 and “objectivity has been tossed out the window,”9 among countless others. These
denouncements about the failure to be objective are always bundled with concerns about the
political and ideological motivations and commitments that have precluded objective evaluation
of the facts. It may be tempting to look at this debate and its surrounding discourse and claim
that the critics of feminist science had it right – just look at what a mess it is when ideology
enters the scientific process. I argue, however, that we ought to investigate the central
assumptions and loci of concern that facilitate multiple and opposing claims to rationality and
objectivity, not for the express purpose of discovering which claims are right (although I argue
that we can uncover new grounds with which to say climate change deniers are wrong), but
rather for the purpose of moving the discussion beyond what appears to be an increasingly
entrenched rhetorical impasse. I argue that both modes of engaging climate change debate have
problematically privileged a detached, rational, individual subject. Where Lloyd wants to
develop the distinctions and frameworks necessary for “the rest of us [in the philosophy of
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science] to move on,”10 I suggest that feminist engagements with reason/rationality and
objectivity reveal some of the limitations of climate change discourse in its contemporary
manifestations, namely its (conscious or unconscious) reproduction of an abstract, masculine
knowing subject.
Two points of clarification are necessary. First, as in the preceding chapters of the
dissertation, my aim is not to discredit “alarmists” and confer legitimacy upon deniers.11 I argue
instead that feminist attempts to demystify the authority of science should prove useful for
furthering and sharpening scientific inquiry in the context of global climate change or
environmental crises. In my own understanding of the nature of climate science, its scope, and
the challenges involved in making predictions, it is a form of inquiry that is quite amenable to the
insights of feminist science studies. Thus, an embrace of feminist approaches to science provides
alternative frameworks for engaging with climate change deniers that do not require a
commitment to understanding (or preserving an understanding of) science as something that
happens independently of social structures. Whereas someone like Naomi Klein argues that
climate change deniers’ appeals to serious disagreement about climate science are merely a
pretense for an extremist neoliberal political agenda,12 I argue that appeals to an objective and
authoritative science that is indifferent to human concerns serve a discursive function that we
should still pay attention to, in spite of—or perhaps in addition to—their motivations. The central
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question of this chapter, then, asks what is the work that the charge of “anti-science” does? I
argue that, even if explicitly used for political ends by disparaging the scientific credibility of the
opponent, the charge serves to uphold the authority of a science whose aims are best pursued by
a neutral, rational, and objective (read: white, western, male) observer.
Secondly, I do not expect to convince political neoliberal climate change deniers to come
around on the idea of a socially situated science, whose techniques and questions become refined
over time in conversation with the emancipatory aims of social justice broadly, and feminist
goals and ideals specifically. I do argue, building on the arguments of the preceding chapters,
that a critical reading of the epistemic demands and commitments at work in this debate is
necessary for revealing the limitations of a debate haunted by the specter of “the invisible hand
of the marketplace of scientific ideas.”13 To engage in this revealing here, I trace the concepts of
ideology, objectivity, and reason as they manifest in each of these debates. I suggest that feminist
engagements with reason and objectivity provide new grounds with which to further public
discussion about climate change, without recourse to a “Truth” about the nature of things that
exists outside of our human attempts to discover it. In particular, feminist engagements that
engage multiple axes of both oppression and analysis—ones that provide grounds
complementary to similar anti-racist, decolonial projects—are crucial for an engagement with an
area of science that straddles the traditional divide between human and nature, thus my turn to
Patricia Hill Collins below.
Relatedly, I further argue that taking a feminist approach to the social study of science
helps to reveal the ways in which environmental science may already be engaging in knowledge
practices that are amenable to emancipatory political projects and feminist futures, or to the goals
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of a scientific practice that is embedded in and critically responsive to its society, in at least two
ways. First, methodologically, as Timothy Luke has argued, climatological science carries within
it a form of social critique – it contains an implicit transgression of dichotomies such as
nature/society, city/country, and urban/rural, while at the same time locating, through its
rigorous scientific methods, the development of capitalism as the originary feature of a warming
planet.14 In this sense, the traditional positivist distinction between human as subject and nature
as object no longer holds. Though this is not a new argument (as we saw in the introduction,
philosophical and geological debate over how to characterize this era of financialization of the
global economy and drastic ecological shifts are preoccupied with negotiating and navigating the
collapse of this distinction15), in this chapter I am interested in extending the general argument to
specifically analyze the way discourse about “the science” negotiates these concepts. Second, the
fact that scientists or science enthusiasts have been instigators and agitators for
environmentalism as a political movement, I think suggests not a vast ideological conspiracy that
undermines the practice of good science, but rather illustrates precisely the socially embedded
nature of scientific inquiry. To treat nature not as a passive object available for human
consumption, but as a dynamic entity deeply entwined in human existence lets researchers ask
different questions, explore different modes for answering these questions, and in some sense
demands that inquiry and responsiveness go hand-in-hand.
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The chapter proceeds in four parts. In the first section, I offer some historical background
to the debate over climate science, as well as highlight some of the discursive resonances
between the anti-science charge in this debate and the anti-science charge lobbied at feminist
philosophers of science. The crucial thread linking these two charges, on my view, is a
demarcation of the boundaries of science and ideology—the former understood to be secured by
the absence of the latter. In order to demonstrate the limits of this dynamic, I turn in the second
and third sections to examining how feminist theorists have engaged the concepts of objectivity
and reason, respectively. Finally, I conclude the chapter with a discussion building on the
argument in chapter one, of how environmental science and feminist philosophy of science are in
some ways important methodological (and political) bedfellows.16

Science vs. Ideology
Lloyd argues that critics of feminist science have placed themselves in a double bind. In
order to uphold the democratic ideals of openness and participation in the sciences, they must
condemn engagements with science that are perceived to be motivated by any ideals at all.
Ideology then becomes a catchall phrase for any ideals that enter the process of knowledge
production except those of the scientific method, which because they are/have proven to work as
tools for ascertaining the truth about the nature of things, cannot be ideology. Ideology is
therefore explicitly contrasted with standards for both reason and objectivity. I argue here that
this strict conceptual division between ideology on the one hand, and reason and objectivity on
the other, is one that has been replicated over and over again in environmental debates—real
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knowledge can only be accessed by impartial observation of actual data; scientific integrity
consists in presenting the findings of empirical data as they actually are, rather than in
accordance with a predetermined worldview or political agenda; we must strive for the most
unbiased understanding of the most objective and comprehensive data; etc.17 If one were to
remove the identifying information or political valence, it would seem as though we have a
consensus—science consists in an objective evaluation of actually observed data, which can be
openly debated in a setting uninfluenced by the interests of politics, money, or individually held
beliefs. Further, these are necessary constraints for protecting the credibility of science, and its
position as impartial or impervious to the goings on of the social world. How then have we all
managed to butcher the integrity and authority of the thing we all so revere? Though the
particulars of the more high profile/public debates over global warming/climate change differ,
there is a central structure and character of argument threading these debates that is best
exemplified in three historical examples and that continues into our current moment: the bet
between environmentalist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon in 1980 over the extent to
which population growth posed a global environmental threat in the form of resource scarcity;18
MIT’s Dr. Richard Lindzen’s public rebuttal of NASA’s James Hansen’s 1988 testimony to
Congress about the dangers of human-caused climate change; and what Naomi Oreskes and Erik
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M. Conway term the “manufactured public debate” between scientist Ben Santer and two retired
physicists with conservative think tank George C. Marshall Institute, Frederick Seitz and Fred
Singer in the mid-1990s.19 Of particular interest in each case is the way in which ideology and
science become construed as opposing forces.
These cases are historically important for the ways in which they captured public
attention, although there are small differences. Each “alarmist” was a scientist compelled to
either take their findings to the public, or to defend their scientific work in public--whereas each
skeptic/denier chose a specific scientist or scientific conclusion as a target for their public
criticism. In the case of scientist Paul Ehrlich and economist Julian Simon, Ehrlich was a
frequent guest on the Tonight Show with Johnny Carson throughout the 1970s promoting his
concerns about the threat of overpopulation, and Simon felt compelled to enter public discourse
in reaction to what he perceived as Ehrlich’s grossly over-exaggerated warnings. For NASA’s
James Hansen and MIT’s Richard Lindzen, Lindzen’s public denouncement of Hansen’s
scientific findings followed on the heels of Hansen’s 1988 presentation on atmospheric warming
to the white house, and intensified following Hansen’s 2001 presentation to the Bush
administration’s Climate Task Force. Between Ben Santer, Frederick Seitz, and Fred Singer the
situation was a bit different. Though Santer was not already a public figure in the way that
Ehrlich and Hansen were, he become public by virtue of the backlash against his involvement
with the IPCC report in 1995. In all three cases, the “controversy” was covered extensively in
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journalistic and popular venues,20 though Oreskes and Conway rightly note that by the time
Seitz, Singer, and the George C. Marshall institute waged their public campaign against Santer,
media outlets were justifying this coverage by reference to the “fairness doctrine” of balanced
reporting.21 These cases also share the common thread of a public back and forth—each alarmist
took to a public venue in order to defend their position, their science, and to point out flaws in
the attack against them. And in each case, the alarmist justified their move into the public sphere
as an ethical requirement rooted in their scientific study/commitment to scientific principles—
although they each took up the ethical call in different ways. Crucially, these three debates track
the spirit and trajectory of the entire “so-called climate debate,” which as climate journalist
Elizabeth Kolbert describes, we might trace back to the backlash against the 1965 report on
global warming to President Lyndon B. Johnson.22
Although the debate between Ehrlich and Simon did not explicitly begin as an “antiscience” discursive battle, it has come to represent the larger ideological conflict between the
visions for the future encapsulated in the environmental and neoliberal positions—namely, if the
economists win, are we catapulting toward a planet inhospitable to human existence? Or, if the
environmentalists win, are we facing a future bereft of human ingenuity and freedom? Though
both positions have a somewhat defensive doomsday element contained in their structure of
argument (we risk the worst-case scenario by conceding to the other position), the neoliberal
position has historically been characterized as that of the optimist, particularly in the case of
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Ehrlich and Simon. For Julian Simon—an economist at the University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign—his utilitarian belief that the measure of right and wrong in society should be the
“greatest happiness of the greatest number,”23 eventually led him to welcome population growth
as representative of progress, and as a necessary condition for more people to live productive and
meaningful lives. Historian Paul Sabin chronicles how Ehrlich become the target of Simon’s
increasing frustration and disillusionment with alarmism over population growth in his book The
Bet.24 Ehrlich—a biologist at Stanford University—was so concerned about the possibility of
population growth leading to resource depletion, mass starvation, spread of disease, and social
unrest that he took it upon himself to bring his research to the public in whatever means possible
throughout the 70s. The central conflict between the two—between the biologist and the
economist—unfolded in public in the form of a bet. In 1980, Simon challenged Ehrlich (in the
pages of Social Science Quarterly) to a wager, and Ehrlich in turn bet Simon that the cost of five
industrial metals (chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten) would increase over the next ten
years.25 If Ehrlich were to win the wager, it would signal to the public that there were limits to
economic growth that would lead to resource scarcity and environmental disaster. If Simon were
to win, it would legitimate his optimism that markets and new technology were inevitably
improving human welfare and thus should not be regulated or contained.
Ehrlich’s and Simon’s methodological and ideological critiques of each other were
intimately intertwined, and in fact, Simon in particular often invoked the phrase “bad news” to
describe journalism that he thought used “exaggerated statistics” to manipulate audiences.26 He
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specifically took issue with the exponential growth models that Ehrlich and his wife, Anne, used
in their book The Limits to Growth—claiming that they were irresponsible, seductive, and
bewitching. The Ehrlichs in turn denounced Simon’s attack on their models as the “tired old
argument” typical of an economist who “know[s] nothing about geology.”27 As their debate
intensified around the setting of the wager, Ehrlich and Simon both engaged in two rhetorical
tactics that are still prominent in anti-science discourse. The first tactic is to flag one small piece
of evidence that either challenges, or more commonly fails to confirm, the opponent’s thesis—
and second is to home in on another piece of evidence that demonstrates the presence of ideology
corrupting the scientific process in the opponent. For Simon, Ehrlich’s insistence on the rights of
nonhuman species to exist clouded his interpretation of the data and led him to dismiss evidence
of human progress. For Ehrlich, Simon was blinded by the promise of technology, favoring
human-centric measures of the quality of life over ones that centered ecosystems. They accused
one another of letting ideology intrude on crucial elements of good scientific practice—the
collection of evidence, the selection of measurement, and interpretation of the findings.
The debate between NASA’s James Hansen and MIT’s Richard Lindzen is somewhat
unique among these historical examples in that Hansen himself seems in some ways to be
grappling with precisely the limits that I am exploring here, of engaging this debate purely on
scientific grounds—though his position is a bit complicated. On one hand, he narrates his move
into the public sphere as having been required by his scientific observations, and he is deeply
attuned to the ways that his opponents deploy scientific language to encourage skepticism about
a set of scientific conclusions. On the other, he chalks the success of their campaign up to his and
other scientists’ failure to communicate the science effectively. He frequently says in interviews
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that he regrets not making the story clear enough for the public,28 and that he in fact holds
scientists responsible for not making the urgency of the situation acutely felt.
To give a bit of context for his view, Hansen’s debate with Lindzen began in the late 80s,
continued through the early aughts, and was in large part facilitated by the latest Bush
administration. As Hansen recounts in his 2009 book Storms of My Grandchildren, he was first
invited to Washington to testify to a Senate committee chaired by Tim Wirth (Colorado Democrat) in 1988, where he “declared, with 99 percent confidence,”29 that the planet was
entering a period of “long-term warming” as a result of the human-caused greenhouse gas effect
in the atmosphere. Hansen, dissatisfied with the way his testimony was received (although it was
an unusually hot summer, the public was confused about how massive hydrologic activity that
year—heavy rains, extreme flooding, and intense thunderstorms, tornadoes, and tropical
storms—fit into the global warming thesis), tried one year later to correct this confusion by
explaining how both extremes—drought and flooding—were a result of a warmer atmosphere.
Unfortunately, when Senator Al Gore received word from Hansen just before this second hearing
that his written testimony had “been altered by the White House Office of Management and
Budget to make [his] conclusions about the dangers of global warming appear uncertain,”30 Gore
alerted the media and Hansen’s attempt to elaborate his earlier testimony was drowned by
coverage of the controversy over the alteration of his testimony. Hansen resolved to “go back to
pure science” after this second attempt and stayed out of the limelight for another decade.
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In the ensuing decade, atmospheric physicist Richard Lindzen began to turn his attention
from his earlier work on ozone photochemistry and atmospheric tides to the study of climate
sensitivity.31 Lindzen was concerned about the validity of computer modeling for predicting
atmospheric shifts and quickly rose to prominence as a global warming contrarian. In 1998, after
a decade of avoiding interaction with the media on his research, Hansen agreed to a debate with
Lindzen and fellow climate denier Pat Michaels. On Hansen’s telling, he agreed because he had
a “clear scientific purpose”—he wanted to succinctly capture and publish the key scientific
differences between his view and their view. The table he created for this debate was the same
table he would go on to present to Vice President Cheney’s “Climate Task Force” in 2001.
Hansen’s recounting of the task force is a fascinating study of the politics of that moment
in its own right. Cheney invited many prominent scientists to its first meeting, and the politicians
in the room seemed to be receptive to the presentations, in spite of the fact that this all took place
against the lead up to the US refusing to sign on to the Kyoto protocol. Most important for the
present purposes, however, is what came next. The committee insisted that the next meeting
should include a scientist who was “not convinced of the reality of concerns about human-made
global warming.”32 The person they selected for Hansen to face off against was Lindzen (who
also contributed extensively to the campaign to shed doubt on the link between smoking
cigarettes and lung cancer that was heavily funded by tobacco companies). In particular, note
how Hansen characterized his failure to convince the task force of his position.
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Hansen recounts how Lindzen used his presentation to the task force to deploy precisely
the rhetorical strategy I outlined above:
Lindzen used part of his presentation to show graphs of observed data such as
temperature and precipitation, emphasizing the large fluctuations and possible
measurement errors. His aim seemed to be a conclusion that global warming is a
very uncertain proposition. He focused on more local observations...he had
managed to defuse his earlier assertion about the absence of global warming,
which had been proven to be wrong.
Lindzen also spent substantial time questioning the motives of scientists who, he
said, made ‘alarmist’ statements. His thesis was that most scientists concurred
with the reality of global warming only because it increased their ability to obtain
research funding.33
Lindzen, on one hand, flagged local data that failed to confirm the global thesis, and on the other,
flagged research funding as a piece of evidence demonstrating the failure to be objective of
scientists who confirmed the global warming thesis. But Hansen’s rebuttal to Lindzen deployed a
similar strategy. For Hansen, Lindzen’s scientific failures derived from a directionality problem.
Because Lindzen was “convinced that nature will find ways to cool itself,” he looked for and
proposed a scientific mechanism to capture this perspective, rather than letting data drive his
investigation of a possible negative feedback for climate forcings.34
Though Hansen repeatedly stresses the strategic and selective mode of argumentation that
Lindzen practices—he likens Lindzen’s rhetorical strategy to that of lawyer rather than
scientist—he nevertheless dedicated space, both in his scientific work and in his book written for
a more popular audience, to engaging Lindzen on the science. Even while he notes that the
structure of scientific argumentation is not usefully adapted to convincing a lay audience of its
implications, his efforts to combat this other mode of argumentation always return to an
insistence on the primacy of the data, and the sanctity of the methods and practices of good

33
34

Ibid, 14-5.
Ibid, 55.
92

science. In effect, even as Hansen with one stroke of the pen recognizes the limits of his own
practices/criteria for achieving his desired ends, in the next he nonetheless insists on them,
returns to them, and holds fast to the authority they ostensibly secure.
In their book Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on
Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Oreskes and Conway argue that the public
debate between Santer on one side, and Seitz and Singer on the other, was manufactured (think
with Proctor in the previous chapter, here) as a corporate/neoliberal strategy to discredit climate
science,35 but note how the discourse unfolded. Santer, who is an atmospheric scientist at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, wrote chapter 8 of the IPCC’s 1995 assessment report
on climate change—the first report to conclude that warming was indeed caused by greenhouse
gases. Chapter 8, “Detection of Climate Change and Attribution of Causes,” specifically
summarized the evidence of this conclusion. Seitz and Singer accused Santer of making changes
to the report explicitly to deceive policy makers and the public. The debate then over what the
facts were—and relatedly, what good science consists in—took place in a series of op-eds in the
Wall Street Journal and in open letters from different organizations either condemning Santer’s
chapter of the IPCC, or in support of both him as a scientist, and his science (method and
conclusions) as legitimate.36
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The substance of Seitz and Singer’s accusations of Santer was that Santer had corrupted
the peer review process – a fundamental aspect of the successful working of the scientific
method. They had compared the report that was approved and signed by the contributing
scientists to the version that was ultimately published and had picked out several passages where
wording was changed or deleted. They argued further that these changes were not merely
changes of language for readability, or other editorial preferences, but that nearly all of the
changes worked to “remove hints of skepticism.”37 The Global Climate Coalition took up this
criticism, arguing that the IPCC had institutionalized “scientific cleansing”—or the dismissal of
evidence that disproves the hypothesis.38 In an editorial note in the June 13, 1996 issue of the
scientific journal Nature, it was noted that the complaints about the revision process were not
entirely groundless—revisions had been made to tidy up the text such that it conformed to the
conventions of a policy recommendation.39 While the authors at Nature were in support of the
IPCC’s report, they nonetheless took up the debate over whether any scientific conventions had
been violated that would invalidate the results of the study—importantly, engaging these critics
in the realm of science/scientific method.
The ideological controversy posed by this public contention over the potential corruption
of the scientific process was made quite explicit—they mapped on neatly to the earlier debates
between Ehrlich and Simon, and Hansen and Lindzen. Seitz and Singer were concerned about
the effects of these policy decisions on energy policy, which would “have an enormous impact
on U.S. oil and gas prices and on the international economy.”40 Santer, the IPCC, and the editors
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at Nature were concerned that the United States’ failure to commit itself to an energy policy that
would limit the emission of greenhouse gases would ultimately lead to the global failure of the
task, contributing extensively to “adverse impacts on human health, with significant loss of life,”
“increases in the potential transmission of vector-borne diseases,” the crumbling of human
infrastructure as related to floods, droughts, and storm surges, and the potential mass migration
of populations from less technologically advanced societies who would be less capable of
adapting to new weather conditions.41 For both parties, the political stakes worked in two
directions. For Santer, Seitz and Singer’s motivation for critiquing his report on scientific
grounds was clearly ideologically motivated. Yet, rather than dismiss their criticism outright, or
merely decry their criticism as ideologically motivated, Santer engaged them on both fronts. He
needed to defend the scientific authority of his conclusions in order to be justified in the policy
prescriptions that followed from them. And their opposition to these policy prescriptions in turn
revealed both the ideological and anti-scientific character of Seitz and Singer’s objections. For
Seitz and Singer on the other hand, Santer’s policy prescription was evidence itself of the
ideological motivation for supposedly corrupting the peer review process.
This two-prong rhetorical approach to rejecting scientific claims in scientific terms, or on
“scientific” grounds, is now a full-fledged political operation on the right.42 In December 2015
for example, Senator Ted Cruz convened a hearing of the Senate Subcommittee on Space,
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Science, and Competitiveness (of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation) entitled, “Data or Dogma? Promoting Open Inquiry in the Debate over the
Magnitude of Human Impact on Earth’s Climate.” At the outset of this hearing, Cruz made the
following claim: “Had [lawmakers] actually looked to the science and the evidence…facts
matter, science matters, data matters. That’s what this hearing is about. Data. According to
satellite data there has been no significant global warming in the last 16 years…Public policy
should follow science, and evidence, and data.”43 Again we see recourse to this two-prong
approach. For Cruz, inconclusive satellite data is enough to call into question the entire thesis of
anthropogenic climate change, and the piece of evidence demonstrating the infiltration of
ideology was the Democrats’ “prebuttal” to his hearing. Cruz sarcastically quipped, “How dare
the science subcommittee in the United States Senate hear testimony from scientists about actual
science!”44 But what is “actual science” here supposed to refer to?
As we have seen, similarly to our critics of feminist science, at the same time as it has
largely been a political tactic of the neoliberal right, both deniers and alarmists in the climate
context bundle the anti-science charge with evidence of the counter-position’s failure to keep
ideology (that is, all values but reason and objectivity) at bay. These accusations have included
such disparagements as: differing motives; misinformation; seemingly authoritative ideas;
distortions of science; twisting of findings; bandwagon; anecdotal; hiding evidence; theological
or philosophical perspective; in defense of a position, rather than seeking truth. One key
difference between these accusations of anti-science and those made of feminist science,
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however, is that for both deniers and alarmists, the failure to keep ideology at bay is itself
evidence of each other’s forsaking of the scientific mandate to pursue truth, and thus the
inaccuracy of their claims. The charge against feminists, on the other hand, is not simply that
they have failed to uphold the integrity of science because of their impartiality, but rather that
they explicitly reject scientific objectivity and reason in favor of ideology, specifically feminist
ideology. It is in this key difference—where the goal of inquiry is the refinement of the tools of
inquiry themselves, rather than the disproving of the opponents’ conclusions—where I suggest
feminist philosophy of science has much to offer.

Objectivity
There are three key feminist engagements with objectivity that I argue demonstrate on
one hand, the false equivalence of feminist critiques of science with anti-science, and on the
other, the limits of the anti-science charge vis-à-vis standards for objectivity. First is the
distinction between critique and rejection, where feminists have argued that critique aims to
broaden access to a set of institutions, practices, or social goods whereas rejection retains an
exclusionary element; second is the historical emergence of objectivity as an ideal, which
feminists have argued needs to be understood as a socially situated value in its own right; and
third is the theoretical justification for an alternate standard, the significance of which I
demonstrate here by way of engagement with Patricia Hill Collins’s proposal for a black feminist
standpoint.
For Lloyd, the criticism that feminists reject objectivity and reason in favor of ideology
reveals tension between the critics and the social view they attack (feminism) on notions of
openness about information, the maintenance of social authority and stability, as well as
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scientific and democratic ideals. Her response to these criticisms’ hinges on the insight that
critique is not the same thing as rejection. Exposing the values, assumptions, and power
dynamics embedded in the scientific method does not equate to a rejection of science. Neither do
challenges to specific instances and aspects of scientific activity necessarily amount to
undermining scientific authority. These critical projects do, however, require investigating (with
scientific rigor) the values, assumptions, and beliefs about the relations between research and the
aspects of the world it seeks to explain—including objectivity as a value/assumption/belief.
The tension over information and control specifically emerges out of the authoritative
role scientific knowledge plays in the structure of our social, political, and economic institutions
and practices. When feminist and radical critics, therefore, expose the (usually unconscious)
weaknesses or self-serving interests of some scientific approaches and scientists, the whole
system is thought by the critics to be at risk for destabilization. Lloyd points out that there is
some truth to this anxiety (as we have seen in the case of climate change debate), however, the
social study of science is nonetheless vitally important for the cultivation and refinement of
scientific knowledge and methods. Indeed, if we are able to generate standards by which to
compare different systems and methods of investigating nature and producing knowledge, we
must have an account of the intricacies of these systems and methods. We must be able to
understand which assumptions and values play a role, and how precisely conflicting interests and
motivations interact with the scientific process and with scientific knowledge.45
This argument that the process of engaging with values, assumptions, interests, and
motivations in the study of science is in fact part of the scientific process is a crucial argument
for thinking about climate change discourse. Lloyd argues that the critics she considers are right
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to worry about defending the authority of the sciences against religious fundamentalism and
superstition, and indeed it is evident that a climate debate that only superficially discusses the
role of values (i.e. claims climate science is wrong/false/not science because it’s leftist fascism,
rather than opening up for debate which values ought to play a role in the production of
knowledge about the climate, and what role those values should play), shares no commitments to
the ameliorative, social justice project of feminist interventions in science.
Consider further, the historical emergence of objectivity. Sandra Harding has argued that
the term has no single meaning, and has been shown to be an historically contested concept.46
Not only has it shifted in meaning over time, but it also lacks a fixed referent—in some moments
in time it refers to specific groups of individuals thought to be capable of producing reliable
knowledge, and in other moments it refers to particular kinds of or approaches to inquiry. In
some cases, the term refers to either the method or the outcome of research. In the latter case, the
term then means something more approximate to “true.”47 Harding’s point in calling attention to
the term’s lack of fixity is not to say that is useless and we ought to discard it altogether, but is
rather to situate the central ideals of positivist-empiricism in their historical moments of
emergence—specifically, in conjunction with modernization theory in the wake of World War II.
For Harding, as for many other historians and sociologists of science,48 positivism—with its
commitments to value-free, objective, and rational inquiry—was a key philosophy that supported
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global development projects and the attempt to spread democracy.49 Thus, the commitment to
open, inclusive, value-free inquiry is not simply the historical progression or unfolding of a
science indifferent to human affairs, but is rather a historically situated commitment to
democracy and the free market, and ought to be seen as such.
I want to conclude the discussion of objectivity by looking closely at Patricia Hill
Collins’s articulation of the black feminist standpoint as an alternative standard for positionality
vis-à-vis the object of research. I argue that her formulation provides a crucial blueprint for the
refinement/adjustment of standards of objectivity in the case of environmental science—
specifically in the way she articulates the epistemic value of connectedness.
For Hill Collins, objectivity is thought to only be attainable by eliminating all varieties of
human characteristics—that of values, emotions, experience, etc.—with the exception of
rationality. This method of scientific inquiry requires distancing of the researcher from his/her
object of study, requires the absence of emotions, emphasizes the inappropriateness of ethics and
values, and prefers adversarial debates as the method of ascertaining truth.50 On her view, these
criteria for legitimate knowledge production are incompatible with a black feminist
epistemology. “Such criteria ask African-American women to objectify themselves, devalue their
emotional life, displace their motivations for furthering knowledge about black women, and
confront, in an adversarial relationship, those who have more social, economic, and professional
power than they.”51 Black women need an alternative epistemology for assessing knowledge
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claims, one that doesn’t require them to adhere to the hegemonic knowledge regime that has in
many ways been responsible for, or at the very least complicit in, the maintenance of Black
women’s oppression and subordination. This alternative epistemology is characterized by several
elements. Firstly, it borrows from an Afrocentric consciousness that developed out of histories of
colonialism, imperialism, slavery, apartheid, and various other systems of racial oppression. Hill
Collins argues that an epistemology that is both feminist and Afrocentric is significant in its
“enrichment of our understanding of how subordinate groups create knowledge that enables them
to resist oppression.”52 In this sense, Afrocentric feminist epistemology does not claim that Black
women have a more accurate view of oppression than other groups, but rather that Black
women’s experiences suggest that the material conditions of oppression can dramatically vary,
and yet generate similarities in epistemology to other subordinate groups.
Another element of Black feminist epistemology in Hill Collins’s view emphasizes
concrete experience as a criterion of meaning. This means that the wisdom that is acquired
through everyday experiences about how the dynamics of race, class, and gender subordination
operate has value for making and assessing knowledge claims.53 Relatedly, Black feminist
epistemology advocates the use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims. “A primary
epistemological assumption underlying the use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims is that
connectedness rather than separation is an essential component of the knowledge-validation
process.”54 This notion of connectedness is important both for the literal process of validating
knowledge—sharing experiences and articulating with others what those experiences mean—and
also for a theoretical challenge to the individualism of liberalism. If liberalism values the
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rational, (sometimes implicit, sometimes explicit) male individual as the relevant source of
knowledge production, an epistemology that values connectedness challenges individualism and
its genderedness. Hill Collins additionally argues that a Black feminist epistemology, rather than
devaluing ethics, adheres to two particular kinds of ethics that are rooted in the experiences of
Black women—the ethic of caring and the ethic of personal accountability. The ethic of caring,
on her view, is made up of an emphasis on valuing uniqueness, the appropriateness of emotions,
and development of the capacity for empathy. These elements of the ethic of caring are rooted in
both African-American culture and women’s experience for Hill Collins. The use of call and
response discourse mode in Black church services is an example of the interactive nature of these
elements in African-American culture, and women’s responsibility for care work exemplifies this
ethic in women’s experience.55 The ethic of accountability itself is the mechanism that holds
people accountable for their knowledge claims. This accountability does not entail evaluating
whether someone has adhered to the objectivity standards of positivism, but rather evaluates
knowledge claims based on an individual’s connectedness, values, and ethics. In other words, an
articulation of how values inform one’s knowledge claims is in turn valuable for assessing the
accountability of those claims. A Black feminist epistemology then not only allows us to produce
knowledge about Black women’s experiences of subordination, but also provides a framework
within which to challenge the dominant, hegemonic regime of knowledge production and
validation. And importantly for resisting the anti-science criticism, this epistemology proposes
alternate standards of evaluation that do not require an impossibly detached rationality, but that
do require an explicit articulation of which values guide the production of knowledge.
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A set of criteria for good scientific practice that requires an articulation of one’s values,
an ethic of personal accountability grounded in one’s connectedness to the object of knowledge,
and that derives its consciousness from the intersecting histories of capitalism and slavery is
vastly important for the climate change debate, and amenable to the scope and scale of
climatological science.

Reason
The concept of reason has a more sordid history for feminists, which extends beyond the
European Enlightenment and Cartesian dualism. Feminist epistemologists, political theorists, and
philosophers of science have all had much to say about the alignment of Reason with maleness,
universality, and the life of the mind—in particular, paying attention to its opposition to emotion,
femaleness, particularity, and the body.56 In Lloyd’s work, for the critics of feminists, reason
stands in opposition to the irrational relativism that feminists supposedly espouse. For both our
deniers and skeptics, reason functions as a criterion for which to denounce one’s debate
opponent, and to dismiss the conclusions of their research. My point here in calling attention to
the rich history of Reason’s maleness is to show how feminist engagements with science recast
the terms of inclusivity that constitute “good science” or good knowledge production. Feminist
standards for reasonableness—unmoored from the abstract and universal principles of
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Enlightenment, or from the gendered dichotomy of mind/body—may provide new and different
criterion by which to assess whether methods are furthering the aims of inquiry, or whether they
are furthering the aims of exclusion from the conversation.57 Lloyd argues that critics of feminist
science engage in the latter—I argue that parties to the debate over anthropogenic climate change
are also employing tactics for the latter aims. Feminist engagements with the gendered legacy of
reason again point us to the limits of the scientific standard for neutrality. While at the same
time, the double bind of critiquing reason—namely, the choice between broadening reason to
include its others or rejecting it altogether as irretrievably masculine—recalls Haraway’s
formulation of the science question in feminism from chapter one.
This long tradition of treating emotion and the body as an impediment to truth or
knowledge—where reason/rationality are precursors to the scientific revolution—becomes
inscribed into the scientific method through the modality of objectivity. As we saw for Hill
Collins and others, objectivity and reason are intimately intertwined as positivist scientific norms
and practices. But feminists have also called attention not just to the role that reason plays in
establishing boundaries around who counts as a knower and what counts as knowledge in the
context of science, they have also, following Michel Foucault, theorized the broader disciplinary
function of the concept. As Amy Allen has argued, the challenge for feminists is in confronting
“the spiral generated by the irreconcilable tension between reason and power, which means that
we accept that our form of rationality is both dangerous and indispensable.”58 The goal should
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be, as she argues, to commit ourselves to the “project of developing a more capacious conception
of reason by reassessing the role played by the body, the affects and emotions, judgment, the
imagination, in the operation of reason.”59 Again, though this approach is not as specifically
engaged in refining reason for the express purpose of refining scientific inquiry, Allen’s
assessment of the importance of critique resonates with Lloyd’s defense of feminist critiques of
science. She writes, “[For Foucault,] genealogical critique not only reveals historical
contingency; it also uncovers the historically specific practices through which our contingent
present has been made. In other words, genealogy as critique involves showing not just that our
present is contingent but also how it has been contingently formed, so that we can understand not
only that it can be transformed but also how to go about doing so.”60 When we track the
exclusionary function of reason, I argue, we have a different angle on the social/political function
of positivist commitments. They appear much more as an investment in preserving the status
quo—following Wolin’s argument from chapter one—than as tools for ascertaining the truth of
things. And further, to recognize these commitments as modes of preserving the status quo
exposes them as contingent, as constructed, and thus as transformable.

Environmental Science and Emancipatory Political Projects
Though I have suggested throughout this dissertation that the concept of the
Anthropocene itself in some sense demands a reconfiguration of the boundary between human
and nature, I have not yet said much about how, nor have I specified why approaching this
argument from the perspective of feminist science studies is important. As a geologic term, the
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Anthropocene describes a new epoch, defining the Earth’s most recent time period as being
human-influenced. In other words, it is a proposal dating roughly from industrialization, which
describes the ways in which atmospheric, geologic, hydrologic, biospheric, and other earth
systems are altered by human activity—in the case of anthropogenic climate change, earth
systems have been so altered by human activity that scientists predict it will soon no longer
sustain human activity, at least in its current arrangements or at its current scale. Outside of earth
systems sciences, the Anthropocene has invited social theorists to ask how it is that humans
produced the conditions of their potential own demise, and what we might do differently in order
to avoid it. A quick survey of recent books with Anthropocene in the title showcases the range of
topics that it spans: The Shock of the Anthropocene: The Earth, History and Us;61 Learning to
Die in the Anthropocene: Reflections on the End of a Civilization; 62 Anthropocene or
Capitalocene? Nature, History, and the Crisis of Capitalism;63 After Nature: A Politics for the
Anthropocene;64 Molecular Red: Theory for the Anthropocene;65 and Arts of Living on a
Damaged Planet: Ghosts and Monsters of the Anthropocene.66 The Anthropocene asks us to
reimagine history, our relationship to the earth, our conceptualization of civilization, our global
economy, our modes of organizing collective life. Further, perhaps most importantly for our
purposes, the Anthropocene as a scientific designation in some sense reimagines the norms and
practices of science itself—insofar as scientists are simultaneously reconfiguring their categories
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for and tools of analysis, they are actually engaging in the kind of epic theorizing that Sheldon
Wolin advocated, as we saw in chapter one.
In what ways can feminist science studies help us to grapple with these questions? On
one hand, they extend the repertoire of tools at our disposal to explain how we got here. They
provide us with cues for ways to reformulate our descriptive and predictive tools. Consider the
examples of the requirements for monocausality and reductionism.67 If what we are trying to
explain—interdependent earth/human systems, amplifying effects, tipping points, etc.—are
phenomena that cannot be captured by monocausal explanations and reductive reasoning,
feminist science studies reminds us that our tools are made and can be re-made. We should ask
what social-historical contingencies are built into those requirements, what assumptions about
the human they smuggle in, and whether they should be refined or be jettisoned. On the other
hand, feminist science studies offers a provocation for imagining alternate futures.
Consider Rosi Braidotti’s work on the posthuman.68 Braidotti calls for an expansion of
theory beyond humanism, arguing that technology, biology, the environment, and all living
organisms (human and non-human), are reactive, interdependent, and mutually constitutive.69
Issues like climate change, for Braidotti, do not represent a crisis for humanity with exclusively
human solutions, but rather demand a renewed effort by transformed interdisciplinary humanities
to engage critically with the posthuman. She advocates for the development of new
subjectivities, the embracing of a posthuman ethics, and the construction of an affirmative
posthumanist politics. On her view, what we can hope is limited by humanism. Reframing
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theories of subjectivity, ethics, and politics in terms of the posthuman allows for the construction
of sustainable alternative futures. These are projects that are enabled by a critical engagement
with the sciences.
The feminist project of demystifying the progressive narrative of an objective and neutral
science does not equate to a move to discredit its methods or conclusions. However, to levy the
charge of “anti-science” by reference to these origin myths as criteria for judgement in some
sense implies that equivalence. Where feminist philosophy of science intervenes, is in
reorienting the conversation around the goals of a demystified – but still self-reflexive and
capable of producing knowledge – science. The goal then is to develop criteria by which to
determine whether parties to a disagreement both share a commitment—not to an out-there, preordained truth—but rather to the improvement of knowledge by continual reflection on the
standards for inquiry. Feminist philosophy of science reveals that the charge of “anti-science” is
neither capacious enough, nor reflexive enough to do this difficult work. In the conclusion, I turn
explicitly to what is possible under the auspices of imagining feminist futures.
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Conclusion
Feminist Futures
“Hard times are coming, when we will be wanting the voices of writers who can see
alternatives to how we live now, and can see through our fear-stricken society and its obsessive
technologies, to other ways of being. And even imagine some real ground for hope.”1
An overarching question of the dissertation has been: how should we understand the
intellectual legacy of critical approaches to the sciences against the backdrop of a political
deadlock in the United States on issues of environmental concern, which is often attributed to the
phenomenon of science denialism? Methodologically, I have looked to feminist science studies
for tools to theorize what is at stake in contestations over the authority of science. Because a
crucial insight of feminist science studies is that the sciences and their societies co-produce one
another, it offers ample resources to attend with care to the political imaginaries at work in
debates over science and over the environment. I have demonstrated how it is that the concepts
and norms of good scientific practice come to counter-intuitively suffuse political positions that
are commonly thought of as anti-scientific, such as that of climate change denial.
I have made two types of arguments throughout this dissertation. On one hand, I have
used feminist approaches and practices as a way to offer a new reading of our current
predicament: I have demonstrated how a structural neoliberalism—an economistic, technocratic,
“rational” organizing of collective life—has in some ways legitimated the tools and tactics with
which political neoliberals (understood as “free” market fundamentalists) take up
discursive/political space on matters of the environment. On the other hand, I have looked to
feminist science studies as a way out of this dilemma, arguing for an approach to knowledge that
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is plural, embedded, embodied, and attuned to asymmetries of power. At the center of my
analysis is a concern for what prospects for the future are built-in to our methodologies, our
technologies for seeing, and our regimes of knowledge-making.
I have made these arguments across differing contexts. It is a predicament that has roots
in the academy, and that gains ground in wider public contexts. I have shown how, in the
discipline of political science, the commitment to both discipline and scientism have in some
ways rendered it a guardian of the status quo—limiting its imaginative scope and capacity to be
critically engaged in the project of remaking the world. In the landscape of public debate, a
similar dynamic is at work that manifests somewhat differently. Appeals to rationality—whether
at the institutional level, or at the epistemic level—serve to insulate market values from public
scrutiny or debate, at the same time as they promote those values as guardians of the status quo,
stylized as neutral.
In chapter one I argued that earlier iterations of what is now often referred to as the
neoliberalization of the academy—increased disciplinarity and the dominance of behaviorism—
were intertwined with the project of relegating theory to merely a resource for scientific
descriptions of the world, and with the artificial separation of “theory” from this “real world.”
Smuggled into this rubric for knowledge production are the values of mid-twentieth century anticommunist fervor, namely an ideological commitment to the specific type of freedom that the
“free market” ostensibly secures. Given the critique of capitalism embedded in the anthropogenic
climate change thesis, I argued that an updated version of Sheldon Wolin’s articulation of the
imaginative vision in political theorizing—one that takes seriously the feminist, anti-racist,
postcolonial critiques of vision and of science—is both the purview of environmental political
thought, and a necessary rubric for it to harness that which is required for a broader, richer, more
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capacious imagining of the possibilities for the ordering of collective life. Specifically, I turned
to Donna Haraway as an interlocuter for Wolin in order to highlight one of the ways in which
feminist debates about epistemology are particularly salient in the context of debates about
climate change. For deniers such as Calvin Beisner, and critics of feminist philosophy of science
from within philosophy of science, “feminists” are a single entity with a unified rejection of
knowledge practices for the purpose of reversing gendered hierarchies. As Haraway’s work
navigating debates among feminists demonstrates, the feminist project is not a monolithic
conspiracy. It is a project that includes interrogating the role of knowledge practices in
establishing the world, and about developing the tools to know more and to know better. In this
sense, though Haraway and Patricia Hill Collins have different views on the question of whether
feminists need to retain a notion of objectivity, they are both committed to the project of refining
the tools for inquiry to offer better accounts of the world.
In order to address the other modes of neoliberalism at work in contestations over the
authority of science on questions of the environment—the attendant political rationalities, their
affects and intensities—I have looked to two different cases where political neoliberalism infuses
climate change denial. In chapter two, I looked to the case of evangelical climate change denial,
in part as a way to interrogate the claim that ignorance about the science explains the deadlock in
political response to climate change (arguments such as the one made by Dale Jamieson that I
also examined in chapter one). Turning to philosophical accounts of ignorance in order to engage
in this interrogation, I argue that if by ignorance we mean lack of scientific literacy, the argument
does not go far enough in explaining how evangelical arguments against climate change work,
how they gain traction, and with what other political imaginaries they resonate. I demonstrate
that the success of the evangelical strategy lies in its redrawing of the terms of discourse and
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debate, positioning itself as guardian of the interests of “real science,” and grounding both of
these moves in the preservation of the evangelical way of life, shot through with market values
and rationality.
In chapter three, I examined the recurrent phenomena in the 20th century where a
prominent environmentalist/scientist engaged in a public debate with a political neoliberal critic
on the subject of whether they had in some way corrupted scientific practice. Turning to critiques
on the same grounds of feminist philosophers of science, I argue that the insistence on the
importance of separating ideology from science in climate change debates cloaks the historically
contingent formations and meanings of reason and objectivity in the guise of neutrality. A return
to feminist arguments that the body, values, and connectedness are required to give better
accounts of the world reveals the limitation of this debate constrained by structural neoliberal
rationality and frustrated by political neoliberal maneuvering. I also argue that environmental
science and feminist philosophy are important political/methodological bedfellows. To the extent
that the Anthropocene reconfigures the boundary between human and nature, we should view
this as an occasion to also re-examine our diagnostic tools.
Taken together, these chapters articulate the multiple registers and modalities in which
norms and concepts of science and neoliberalism permeate our political debates and our ways of
organizing collective life. For example, debates about climate response often boil down to
whether a particular policy proposal can generate jobs or boost the economy as a metric of its
political feasibility, never mind that the Anthropocene may in fact demand completely
reimagining our relationship to work in the first place. There are many more elements of the
intertwinement of these dynamics in the context of environmental questions that are beyond the
scope of this dissertation but are worth noting. Perhaps most importantly, I have left unanswered
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questions about how neoliberalism as a substantive economic and political philosophy has dealt
with many of the questions surrounding the norms and concepts that in some way political
neoliberals in the context of the United States take for granted or deploy without rigor. That the
figures I read in this dissertation construe the “free” market as natural indeed has consequences
for all of the places in which they come up against environmentalists, but what did nature or
natural mean to the “original” neoliberals? This is a question that merits further investigation.
The case of Friedrich Hayek is particularly pressing—he is cited across the board, to a diverse
array of ends, by almost every denier who bothers to engage in the practice of citation. Similarly,
Julian Simon—the economist who publicly contested Paul Ehrlich’s concern over population
growth—is cited by many more contemporary thinkers and was himself hugely influenced by
Hayek’s thought.
It is also worth reiterating that though I spend the bulk of this dissertation deploying
feminist science studies as a reading practice to develop a new angle on the present, and largely
gesture to the positive project of developing alternate modes of engagement, this is where I think
future work will be most generative. To that end I conclude by developing, by way of a slight
detour through science fiction, what I take to be three crucial criteria to guide work on the
positive project of developing an imaginary for alternate futures: broad and adventurous reading
practices, playfulness with our tools for inquiry, and an insistence on reframing the terms of
debate. I turn to fiction as a way to work through the different valences and shapes of
imagination at work both in this dissertation and in discourse about the environment generally, in
part because it already has an imaginative element built into it and as such, is useful as a point of
comparison. Further, particularly in the case of the genre of climate fiction (cli-fi), authors have
explicitly tried to do that at which James Hansen claims he failed—to make crystal clear what
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the evidence suggests we risk by doing nothing—thus is crucial terrain for exploring the
epistemologies at work in establishing the climate dystopia.

Imagining Feminist Futures
In order to sketch the criteria I outlined above, I offer here a reading of one particular
way in which a handful of recent cli-fi novels have grappled with the theme of reason to
demonstrate that fictionalizing on its own is not sufficient, but that an intentional, critical
engagement with epistemic practices is also required. A series of opinion pieces in the New York
Times in July 2014, for example, debated the power of climate change fiction to spur reactions to
global warming.2 The primary source of disagreement among the authors was whether a
fictionalized account of the worst-case scenario leaves climate activists vulnerable to critique
when their predictions fail to materialize, or whether it has an intrinsically self-selecting
audience and serves to entrench pre-existing views. I argue that in thinking about the role of
imagination to spur action on climate change, we should pay special attention to the
epistemologies at work in our imaginaries. Even across these works of fiction, I argue,
imagination about the future of the human relationship with the planet carries the burden of the
legacy of the enlightenment. I then conclude by way of drawing out the criteria I have proposed

2

George Marshall, “Climate Fiction Will Reinforce Existing Views.” The New York Times, July
29, 2014; Sheree Renee Thomas, “Imagination Will Help Find Solutions to Climate Change,”
The New York Times, July 29, 2014; J.P. Telotte, “Science Fiction Reflects Our Anxieties,” The
New York Times, July 29, 2014; Heidi Cullen, “Personal Stories About Global Warming Change
Minds,” The New York Times, July 29, 2014; Sean O’Heigartaigh, “Hollywood Global Warming
Dramas Can Be Misleading,” The New York Times, August 4, 2014; Dan Bloom, “Movies Like
‘Snowpiercer’ Can Sound the Alarm,” The New York Times, July 30, 2014.
114

through the example of a different kind of science fiction—what Naomi Oreskes and Erik M.
Conway have called “science-based fiction.”3
There are many novels that can be categorized as cli-fi, but the selections I offer here are
three that have been heralded as paradigmatic examples of this kind of fiction in the popular
press.4 Indeed, journalists have written about these books as texts that need to be seriously
considered in light of the warning they sound for the consequences should climate change go
unaddressed. They have also been characterized as distilling complicated scientific hypotheses
for a wider (and younger) audience, and as carrying exciting potential for rallying people to the
cause. Returning to Ursula K. Le Guin’s call to action in the epigraph, we must ask whether (and
which) future alternatives are made possible. It should also be noted that the future of climate
dystopia is, in each book, not-so-distant. In some cases, it is a future that has already begun – the
moment of irreversibility or impossibility lives both in the novels’ past, and also in our own. I
read in each case a struggle on the part of the author to square the promise of the enlightenment
with the reality of climate change—or in other words, I read each of these novels as grappling
precisely with the dilemma from Lyndon B. Johnson’s letter in the introduction to this
dissertation. The common thread between these novels, for our purposes, is that the loss of
reason is rendered as an effect of environmental destruction. Oreskes and Conway, by contrast,
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posit that the criteria for reason itself play a central role in establishing the dystopia in the first
place.5
In J.G. Ballard’s 1962 novel The Drowned World,6 biologist Dr. Robert Kerans makes
the decision to abandon his post with a United Nations military unit, which is navigating the
earth via lagoon systems that cover submerged cities, in the wake of solar storms that have
melted the planet’s ice caps, making tropical areas uninhabitable, forcing mass migration toward
the poles, eventually leading to their colonization under direction from the UN, and ushering in a
new Triassic era. Leading up to the departure of the crew’s ship, members of the expedition,
Kerans included, begin to experience similar dreams that appear to affect their physical and
mental health. Although the temperatures are rapidly rising, and the submerged city will soon be
uninhabitable, Kerans, Dr. Bodkin, and Beatrice Dahl all choose to remain in the lagoons above
what was once London. Each of the three begin to withdraw further into isolation, gradually
more incapable of separating dream from reality, and feeling compelled to move further south
toward the uninhabitable area around the equator.
During a diving excursion, Kerans confronts death when his air supply is suddenly cut.
When he comes to above water, he assumes it was an intentional attempt on his life by the pirate
Strangman who has recently entered the lagoon with his crew of men and giant alligators, only to
be told that he had wrapped the cord and cut the supply himself. He wonders: “Was the drowned
world itself, and the mysterious quest for the south which has possessed Hardman, no more than
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an impulse to suicide, an unconscious acceptance of the logic of his own devolutionary descent,
the ultimate neuronic synthesis of the archaeopsychic zero?”7 Although Ballard does not attribute
the drowning of the world explicitly to human hubris, he portrays reason and self-preservation as
intimately linked throughout the novel, positing reason as in some sense the guardian of a
particular understanding of humanity.
Nathaniel Rich and Paolo Bacigalupi both depict the fraying of reason in dystopian
futures that are much closer to the present – the protagonists in both novels make choices that
others in their lives deem irrational, but that they themselves feel as compulsions rather than as
options. In Rich’s Odds Against Tomorrow,8 gifted mathematician Mitchell Zukor builds a
successful career calculating risk for corporations on the back of his obsession with cultural
fears. When a storm - a summer of intense drought, followed by a massive hurricane - floods and
destroys New York City, Zukor is faced with the choice of returning to the city to help rebuild
(and incidentally turn a large profit on future risk management), or to remain isolated in
undeveloped marshland, attempting to feed and shelter himself. For him, the former is not an
option, and his compulsion toward isolation is incomprehensible to his remaining companions. In
Bacigalupi’s The Water Knife,9 the American southwest has been decimated by drought, leading
to increased outbreaks in destructive wildfire and dust storms, and heavily militarized conflict
over the control of water sources. In Phoenix, a series of high-profile murders lead to the
exposure of a plot to cut off the city’s access to water completely, abandoning its population most of whom are already destitute. For those without resources, fleeing the impending disaster
is not a real option. However, there is also a somewhat irrational reluctance of many other
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residents to leave the city. The pull of self-preservation is weak, and is in some cases, explicitly
rejected. Journalist Lucy Monroe, who is not even an Arizona native, continuously refuses her
sister’s plea to join her family in Vancouver, which has not yet felt the effects of climate change
so acutely. In her narration, she continually acknowledges the irrationality of her own actions,
and simultaneously feels the impulse to resist death diminish.
Although these treatments of reason are less foundational aspects of the worst-case
scenario for Rich and Bacigalupi, they do consistently call into question what kind of survival we
will have made possible if we continue down this path. But note the implicit link in these texts
between the rationality of and the conditions for survival. Where conditions are volatile and
resources scarce, reason no longer dictates. Characters are consumed with the state of their
sanity, often at the risk of self-preservation. The rational, self-preserving subject is destabilized,
and it is unclear in all cases whether any semblance of humanity as we know it will persist.
Without the rational drive to preservation, relations between humans are fraught, and the impulse
to protect the species at all disappears. The echo of reason as that which propels not only human
progress, but basic survival reverberates throughout these novels. These novels do not have
happy endings, and the uncertainty with which they end is sustained throughout the narratives by
these cracks in sanity – it is only through the loss of self-preservation through reason that we can
see the extent to which civilization is at risk.
By way of contrast, consider a different example. In a 2014 experimental piece of
“science-based fiction,” Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway tell the story of the collapse of
Western civilization from the perspective of a historian in a future civilization.10 The animating
question of the book is how to explain the collapse of a civilization who knew that collapse was
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imminent. They ask, how should we account for the “shadow of ignorance and denial [that] had
fallen over people who considered themselves children of the Enlightenment?”11 In part, the
answer that they give resonates with the reading I have offered throughout the dissertation of the
sort-of feedback loop between structural and political neoliberalism. They point to several
different facets of scientific norms and practices as evidence for the failure of Enlightenment
principles to make good on its promises—and in each case, they highlight the constructed nature
of these epistemic commitments. They cite the “archaic Western convention of studying the
physical world in isolation from social systems,”12 physical scientists becoming “entangled in
arcane arguments about the ‘attribution’ of singular events,”13 scientists “trained as specialists”
failing to “articulate and convey this broad pattern,”14 the prevalence of the “general
phenomenon of human adaptive optimism,”15 “the epistemic structure of Western science…
organized both intellectually and institutionally around ‘disciplines’ in which specialists
developed a high level of expertise in a small area of inquiry,”16 reductionism and tractability
impeding “investigations of complex systems,”17 and the dominance of a 95 percent confidence
limit that “had neither epistemological nor substantive mathematical basis” and can only be
explained as “a social convention rooted in scientists’ desire to demonstrate their disciplinary
severity.”18 This piece is a striking illustration of the modes of imagining, imagination, and
imaginary at work from the critical, feminist perspective. Oreskes and Conway are historians by
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training, and yet their foray into speculative fiction based on scientific research is both an
exercise in the imagination, and a commentary on the imaginaries that suffuse current political
discourse and scientific practice. Unlike the novels that portray rationality as the guardian of
humanity, Oreskes and Conway imagine a role for an alternate set of epistemic criteria. In this
sense, their book provides a useful landscape for working out the three commitments for which I
argue.
First, I argue for broad and adventurous reading practices—in the context of political
theory, this means a more expansive notion of what counts as a text for political theorizing. This
recommendation is in part a resistance against being overly disciplined by our disciplinary
conventions, but also by our institutional arrangements. In the example of the Oreskes and
Conway book, as historians of science that they write a history from the future that requires them
to track the development of scientific knowledge and the arrangements of scientific practice is
unsurprising, in fact, that is their purview as historians of science. That they look to Kim Stanley
Robinson (a prominent science fiction writer) for inspiration and for substantive thematic
interventions might be more surprising.19 And yet, Robinson serves as more than mere
inspiration for the text. They borrow an analytic practice of engaging these themes and
overarching questions from a text that might otherwise be an unusual methodological source for
historians. Broad and adventurous reading practices can also help serve decolonial ends vis-à-vis
the Western canon.20 If we have a more expansive notion of a text, we can cultivate citation

19

Kim Stanley Robinson, Forty Signs of Rain, Fifty Degrees Below, and Sixty Days and
Counting (New York: Spectra Publishers, 2005-2007).
20
Mignolo, Walter D. and Catherine E. Walsh, On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis,
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2018).
120

practices that destabilize the idea of “the west” as the center of human creativity, ingenuity, and
freedom.
Second, I argue for playfulness with our tools for inquiry—following philosopher Maria
Lugones, who conceived of playfulness as an orientation that resists the agonistic
competitiveness of a world structured by rules you had no hand in making, and which your very
presence contests.21 In her case, it is her subjectivity as both/neither that challenges the status
quo, yet renders her invisible by its rules. She proposes instead that playfulness be thought of as
a radical openness:
We are by the river bank. The river is very, very low. Almost dry. Bits of water
here and there. Little pools with a few trout hiding under the rocks. But mostly is
wet stones, grey on the outside. We walk on the stones for awhile. You pick up a
stone and crash it onto the others. As it breaks, it is quite wet inside and it is very
colorful, very pretty. I pick up a stone and break it and run toward the pieces to
see the colors. They are beautiful. I laugh and bring the pieces back to you and
you are doing the same with your pieces. We keep on crashing stones for hours,
anxious to see the beautiful new colors. We are playing. The playfulness of our
activity does not presuppose that there is something like "crashing stones" that is
a particular form of play with its own rules. Rather the attitude that carries us
through the activity, a playful attitude, turns the activity into play. Our activity has
no rules, though it is certainly intentional activity and we both understand what
we are doing. The playfulness that gives meaning to our activity includes
uncertainty, but in this case the uncertainty is an openness to surprise. This is a
particular metaphysical attitude that does not expect the world to be neatly
packaged, ruly. Rules may fail to explain what we are doing. We are not selfimportant, we are not fixed in particular constructions of ourselves, which is part
of saying that we are open to self-construction. We may not have rules, and when
we do have rules, there are no rules that are to us sacred. We are not worried
about competence. We are not wedded to a particular way of doing things. While
playful we have not abandoned ourselves to, nor are we stuck in, any particular
"world." We are there creatively.22
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This extensive quote (or perhaps unusual quoting practice) is instructive for several
reasons. In the spirit of creative openness, the example itself is crucial to the elaboration of the
concept. There is an affective dimension to the openness of playfulness, but it is also tactile and
aesthetic. It describes processes of meaning-making where the meaning need not be—in fact,
ought not be—predetermined, and where those processes are dynamic and interactive. That we
may remake ourselves, remake the world, as we remake our tools is part of the imaginative
process that we should embrace.
Oreskes and Conway play a bit with this idea in their book. One way to read their
assessment of the ways in which the Enlightenment failed to make good on its promises is that
the West refused to be open to remaking itself. Somewhat paradoxically even, the societies that
did survive the collapse of the West were the Authoritarian ones. As they tell it, a bull-headed
commitment to an abstract notion of freedom both undermined the democratic institutions that
were ostensibly meant to secure this freedom, at the same time as it ran up against its own
material limits. I argue that we should understand this failure as a failure to be playful. But
Oreskes and Conway are also playing themselves in this text. In addition to employing broad
reading practices, they are playing with the conventions and rules of their discipline in a way that
allows them to be more expansive in their diagnoses, and more creative in imagining solutions.
From the vantage point of a future historian, unmoored from the requirements of 95%
confidence, monocausal explanations, and reductionism, they can tell a story about our moment
that interweaves counter-veiling forces, treats counterfactuals with some rigor, and that
effectively challenges some of the dominant norms and concepts taken for granted in the West as
natural and inevitable, or as required for the preservation of the species.
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Finally, I argue for an insistence on redefining the terms of debate. Another assessment
Oreskes and Conway make regarding the future collapse of Western civilization was a failure to
take seriously critical engagements with the sciences. Scientists themselves were part of this
problem – in failing to recognize some of their tools for inquiry as social conventions rather than
as necessary for knowledge production, they failed to have an expansive enough view of what
counted as evidence. But the institutional arrangements of scientific research and knowledge
production were also culpable. As I have argued throughout this dissertation, to double-down on
neutrality as a measure of scientific authority is to preserve the status-quo of institutional
arrangements that structure the production of scientific knowledge under its current logics and
rubrics.
What would it mean to redefine or reframe the terms of debate away from those of
preventing the encroachment of ideology or bias? Recent work in indigenous philosophy and
environmental justice is instructive on this. To reframe the Anthropocene as already a climatedystopia for peoples whose societies have already been transformed through colonial violence,23
or to demand that communities play an active role in directing research relative to their access to
environmental goods or exposure to environmental harms,24 is to commit upfront to a set of
values that guide the process of knowledge production other than those styled as neutral. And
further, it allows for imagining criteria for knowledge production that takes seriously the role
that capitalism has played in establishing our own climate dystopia.
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